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We introduce a theoretical framework in which to study interdependent preferences, where the
outcome of others aﬀects the preferences of the decision maker. The dependence may take place
in two conceptually diﬀerent ways, depending on how the decision maker evaluates what the
others have. In the ﬁrst he values his outcome and that of others on the basis of his own utility.
In the second, he ranks outcomes according to a social value function. These two diﬀerent views
of the interdependence have separate axiomatic foundations. We then characterize preferences
according to the relative importance assigned to social gains and losses, or in other words to pride
and envy. Finally, we study a two period economy in which agents have our social preferences.
We show how envy leads to conformism in consumption behavior and pride to diversity.
JEL classiﬁcation: D81; E21
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2“In Silicon Valley, millionaires who don’t feel rich,” The New York Times1
1 Introduction
Man is a social animal, as Seneca famously wrote. Who we are, our persona, is shaped by
both the private and social consequences of our choices. In contrast, Decision Theory has been
mainly concerned with the private side of economic choices: standard preference functionals give
no importance to the relative standing of the outcomes of the decision maker relatively to those
of his peers. This is in stark contrast with the large empirical literature that emphasizes the
importance of relative outcomes in economic choice. In Section 1.4 we will see, for example,
how the empirical signiﬁcance of relative income and consumption has been widely studied,
from Dusenberry’s early contribution to the many recent works on external habits, the so-called
keeping up the with the Joneses phenomenon.
The ﬁrst purpose of this paper is to ﬁll this important gap between theory and empirical
evidence by providing a general choice model that takes into account the concern for relative out-
comes. We generalize the classic subjective expected utility model by allowing decision makers’
preferences to depend on their peers’ outcomes. The axiomatic system and the representation
are simple, and reduce naturally to the standard theory when the decision maker is indiﬀerent
to the outcome of others. We describe the representation in Section 1.1.
How the relative standing of peers’ outcomes aﬀect preferences depends on the decision mak-
ers’ attitudes toward social gains and losses, that is, on their feelings of envy and pride. We
call envy (invidia) the negative emotion that agents experience when their outcomes fall below
those of their peers, and we call pride (superbia) the positive emotion that agents experience
when they have better outcomes than their peers.2 Attitudes toward social gains and losses
describe the way concern for relative outcomes aﬀect individual preferences. Also these atti-
tudes diﬀer across individuals. Our second purpose is thus to provide the conceptual tools to
make meaningful intra personal comparisons (“a person is more proud than envious”) and inter
personal comparisons (“a decision maker is more envious than another one”). The psychological
motivations for the concern for relative outcomes and their main characteristics are discussed in
Section 1.2
Our third and ﬁnal purpose is to provide a link between the features of the preferences that
we have identiﬁed and the main properties of economic equilibria. For example, in a general
two-period economy we provide a link between equilibrium income distribution and the relative
weights of envy and pride in agents’ preferences. This link is outlined in Section 1.3
1.1 The Representation and its Interpretation




represent the situation in which agent
o takes act fo, while each member i of the agent’s reference group takes act fi. Our decision
1Article by Gary Rivlin, August 5, 2007.
2Smith and Kim (2007) review diﬀerent meanings of envy. They deﬁne envy as “an unpleasant and often
painful blend of feelings characterized by inferiority, hostility, and resentment caused by a comparison with a
person or group of persons who possess something we desire.” This is essentially the same deﬁnition that we use.
Envy and pride are fundamental and specular social emotions, often explicitly considered by religious and social
norms, from sumptuary laws (Vincent 1934) to the sixth and seventh deadly sins of the early Christian tradition
(Aquaro 2004).



















The ﬁrst term of this representation is familiar. The index u(fo (s)) represents the agent’s
intrinsic utility of the realized outcome fo (s), P represents his subjective probability over the
state space S, and so the ﬁrst term represents his subjective expected utility from act fo. The
eﬀect on o’s welfare of the outcome of the other individuals is reported in the second term. The
index v (fo (s)) represents the social value o attaches to outcome fo (s). This index v may or
may not be equal to u, according to two completely diﬀerent interpretations for the concern for
relative outcomes that we describe in section 1.2.
Given a proﬁle of acts, agent’s peers will get outcomes (fi (s))i∈I once state s obtains. If o
does not care about the identity of who gets the value v (fi (s)), then he will only be interested
in the distribution of these values. This distribution is represented by the term
P
i∈I δv(fi(s)) in
(1) above, where δx is the measure giving mass one to x. Finally, the function % is increasing
in the ﬁrst component and stochastically decreasing in the second. This term represents o’s
satisfaction that derives from the comparison of his outcome with the distribution of outcomes
in his reference group. The feeling is experienced ex-post, after the realization of the state.
The choice criterion (1) is an ex ante evaluation, combining standard subjective expected
utility and the expected ex post envy/pride feeling that decision makers anticipate. That
is, in choosing among acts decision makers consider both the private beneﬁt of their choices, R









Standard theory is the special case when the function % is zero, namely when decision makers
do not care about possible social externalities of their choices and only the intrinsic properties
of the choices’ material outcomes matter.
We consider this ex ante compromise as the fundamental trade-oﬀ that social decision mak-
ers face. This compromise takes a simple, additive, form in (1). This is a very parsimonious
extension of standard theory able to deal with concerns for relative outcomes. Behavioral foun-
dation and parsimony are thus two major features of our criterion (1). In contrast, as we detail
in Section 10.2, the ad hoc speciﬁcations used in empirical work often overlook this key trade-oﬀ
and focus only relative outcome eﬀects, that is, on the % component of (1).
Finally, observe that for ﬁxed (fi)i∈I the preference functional (1) represents agent’s within
group preferences over outcomes, which are conditional on a group having (fi)i∈I. For ﬁxed fo,
the preference functional (1) instead represents between groups preferences, which are condi-
tional on the agent’s outcome. Depending on which argument in V is ﬁxed, either fo or (fi)i∈I,
the functional V thus represents preferences between or within groups.
1.2 Envy and Pride
The index % in the representation (1) describes the eﬀect on the decision maker’s well being
of the social proﬁle of outcomes. The social value of these outcomes is recorded by the index
v. If v is equal to the index u, the representation is derived in Theorem 1; if it is diﬀerent,
the representation is derived in Theorem 2. These two diﬀerent representations correspond to
two diﬀerent views and explanations of the eﬀect of the fortune of others on our preferences.
To focus our analysis, we concentrate on envy. We propose two explanations of this key social
emotion, based on learning, dominance, and competition.
4A Private Emotion An introspective view suggests that when we are envious we consider
the outcomes of others, like goods and wealth, thinking how we would enjoy them, evaluating
those goods from the point of view of our own utility, and comparing it to the utility that we
derive from our own goods and wealth. This interpretation requires u = v in the representation
(1). This view of envy points to a possible functional explanation: the painful awareness that
others are achieving something we consider enjoyable reminds us that perhaps we are not doing
the best possible use of our abilities. Envy is a powerful tool of learning how to deal with
uncertainty, by forcing us to evaluate what we have compared to what we could have.
Envy is, from this point of view, the social correspondent of regret. These two emotions are
both based on a counterfactual thought. Regret reminds us that we could have done better, had
we chosen a course of action that was available to us, but we did not take. Envy reminds us
that we could have done better, had we chosen a course of action that was available to us, but
someone else actually chose, unlike us. In both cases, we are evaluating the outcome of choices
that we did not make from the standpoint of our own utility function; that is, u = v in (1). We
regret we did not buy a house that was cheap at some time in which the opportunity presented
itself because we like the house: and we envy the house of the neighbor because we like the
house. In both cases, we learn that next time we should be more careful and determined in the
use of our talent.
A related view of envy motivates the classic theory of social comparison developed by Fes-
tinger (1954a, 1954b): People have a drive for a precise evaluation of their own opinion and
abilities. An important source of information for such an evaluation is provided by the outcome
of others: for example, if I want to know whether obtaining a law degree is hard or easy it
is useful to know whether others have succeeded or failed. A corollary of this premise is the
similarity hypothesis: individuals will typically be more interested in the outcome of others who
are similar, the peers, rather than dissimilar, because the information that we derive on their
probability of success is going to be more relevant for the evaluation of our own probability. The
theory has been tested and further developed in the last ﬁfty years: the fundamental intuition
is that we consider the outcome of others as informative on the nature of the task, and on the
relationship between eﬀort and probability of success, just as we consider our previous personal
experiences.3
Envy is, however, an essentially social emotion. We do care whether the successful outcome
is simply a counterfactual thought (as in regret) or the concrete good fortune of someone else.
We may feel envy even if we do not like at all the good that the other person has. There must
be another reason for envy, a purely social one.
A Social Emotion The search for dominance through competition is a most important force
among animals because of the privileged access to resources, most notably food and mates, that
status secures to dominant individuals. The organization of societies according to a competition
and dominance ranking is thus ubiquitous, extending from plants to ants to primates. For exam-
ple, plants regulate competition toward kin (Falik, Reides, Gersani, and Novoplansky 2003 and
Dudley and File 2007), and examples of hierarchical structures have been documented in insects
(Wilson 1971), birds (Schjelderup-Ebbe 1935 and Chase 1982), ﬁshes (Nelissen 1985 and Chase,
Bartolomeo and Dugatkin 1994, Chase, Tovey, Spangler-Martin and Manfredonia 2002), and
3See, e.g., Suls, Martin, and Wheeler (2002) for an introduction to recent advances in Social Comparison
Theory.
5mammals (Greenberg-Cohen, Alkon and Yom-Tov 1994), particularly primates (Maslow 1936,
Dunbar 1988, Cheney and Seyfarth 1990, Pereira 1995, Pereira and Fairbanks 2002, Sapolsky
2005).
Quite naturally, competition and dominance feelings play a fundamental role in human
societies too, whose members have a very strong preference for higher positions in the social
ranking: the proposition has been developed in social psychology, from Maslow (1937) to Hawley
(1999) and Sidanius and Pratto (1999). Envy induced by the success of others is the painful
awareness that we have lost relative positions in the social ranking. In this view the good that
the other is enjoying is not important for the utility it provides and we do not enjoy, but for
its cultural/symbolic meaning, that is, for the signal it sends. This signal is important because
others, in addition to us, can see it and accordingly change their view on what our current
ranking is.
Since it is perceived in a social environment, the way in which it is evaluated has to be social
and diﬀerent from the way in which we privately evaluate it. We may secretly dislike, or fail to
appreciate, an abstract painting. But we may proudly display it in our living room if we think
that the signal it sends about us (our taste, our wealth, our social network) is valuable. And
we may envy someone who has it, even if we would never hang it in our bedroom if we had it.
When the eﬀect of the outcome of others is interpreted in this way, the index is a function v,
possibly diﬀerent from the private evaluation function u.
This social index v is as subjective as u: even if they evaluate the outcome of others according
to v, individuals have personal views on what society considers important. For example, a
speciﬁc individual may have a completely wrong view of what peers deem socially important.
The perception of what peers consider important, as opposed to what the decision maker values
and likes, is taken into account when evaluating peers’ outcomes. This is what subjectively (as
everything else in decision theory) the individual regards as considered socially valuable.
1.3 Social Economics
To illustrate the economic scope of our derivation, in Section 9 we study a general two period
economy where agents have our social preferences. Our main ﬁnding is that in these social
economies envy leads to conformism, pride to diversity.
Speciﬁcally, we consider an economy with a continuum of identical agents who live for two
periods. In the ﬁrst period agents have an endowment y and choose a consumption c, from which
they derive a utility u(c). In the second period they receive a stochastic endowment Y (s), and
their consumption is then given by d(s) = Y (s)+R(y−c), from which they derive a discounted
expected utility βE[u(Y + R(y − c))].
In every period agents’ utility functions have a “social” additional term of the simple form:
γ(c − c)
where c is the average consumption in the economy and γ is an increasing function. In the
second period this externality is discounted by the same discount factor β.
When deciding how much to consume in the ﬁrst period, the agent faces a trade-oﬀ: if he
increases his consumption today he will increase his relative ranking today, but he will also
decrease his standing in the next period. He is thus comparing a positive eﬀect today with a
negative eﬀect in the next period. This trade-oﬀ (for example, noted in Binder and Pesaran
2001 and Arrow and Dasgupta 2007) points to a crucial feature of the preferences: the relative
strength of the eﬀect on individual welfare of being in a dominant or dominated position in the
social hierarchy.
6To better see how these relative strength aﬀect choices, we consider the two polar cases of
pure envy and pure pride. The equilibrium set will be completely diﬀerent in the two cases: it
will be conformist in the case of pure envy (all agents consume the same) and diversiﬁed in the
pure pride case (identical agents choose a diﬀerent consumption).
Agents with pure envy preferences only care about the situation in which their consumption
is below the average value. For example take
γ(x) = θx−,
where x− ≡ min(x,0). Since the function is concave, the overall program of each agent is
concave, and so the equilibrium is symmetric: all agents choose the same consumption.
In contrast, agents with pure pride preferences have, for example,
γ(x) = θx+,
where x+ ≡ max(x,0). This function is convex, something that completely changes the struc-
ture of the equilibrium set. The equilibrium can only be non-symmetric: although agents are
identical, they will choose diﬀerent consumptions. Some will choose to have a dominant position
in the current period, at the expense of a dominated one in the future, and others will choose
the opposite.
Summing up, envy is, loosely speaking, a concave externality while pride is a convex one.
The resulting equilibria are then qualitatively very diﬀerent in the two cases. This is a novel
insight of our analysis that was made possible by the axiomatic analysis of the earlier part of
the paper.
We close by observing how the social nature of consumption emerges in these social economies.
In fact, even though we consider economies with a continuum of individually negligible agents,
whose behavior does not aﬀect per se the outcomes of the other agents, still Nash equilibrium is
the natural solution concept to use. Here, agents’ interact through the consumption externalities
caused by the social dimension of their decisions; the social economy is in equilibrium when all
these consumption externalities balance each others.
1.4 Related Literature
The modern economic formulation of the idea that the welfare of an agent depends on the
relative as well as the absolute consumption is usually attributed to Veblen (1899):
... soon as the possession of property becomes the basis of popular esteem, therefore,
it becomes also a requisite to the complacency which we call self-respect. In any
community where goods are held in severalty it is necessary, in order to his own
peace of mind, that an individual should possess as large a portion of goods as
others with whom he is accustomed to class himself; and it is extremely gratifying
to possess something more than others ...
Fifty years after The Theory of the Leisure Class, social psychology dealt with the issue of
social comparison with the works of Festinger (1954a, 1954b). As we mentioned, the focus of
the theory is orthogonal to that of Veblen: the comparison with others is motivated by learning,
and the outcome of the others is relevant to us only because it provides information that may
be useful in improving our performance.
7Veblen and Festinger provided the ﬁrst instances of the two views of social emotions. Our
work is an attempt to provide a structure in which these two views can be compared and
experimentally tested. Veblen’s view has been dominant or even exclusive in inspiring research
in economics. We hope that our paper may help in restoring a more balanced view.
As we just observed, the Veblenian intuition that an agent’s well-being is determined not
only by the intrinsic utility of his material consumption, but also by his relative standing in the
society or in his peer group had a huge impact on the socioeconomic thought (e.g., Duesenberry
1949, Easterlin 1974, Frank 1985, and Schor 1998) and the phenomenon called keeping up with
the Joneses has been heating economic debate for the last two decades.
The signiﬁcance of one’s relative outcome standing has been widely studied in the economics
and psychology of subjective well-being (e.g., Easterlin 1995 and Frey and Stutzer 2002, and the
references therein) and there is a large body of direct and indirect empirical evidence in support
of this fundamental hypothesis (e.g., Easterlin 1974, van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer
1985, Tomes 1986, Clark and Oswald 1996, McBride 2001, Zizzo and Oswald 2001, Luttmer
2005, Ravina 2005, and Dynan and Ravina 2007).
At the same time, the introduction of agents’ concerns for relative outcomes, especially in
consumption and income, into economic models has been shown to carry serious implications
cutting across diﬀerent ﬁelds such as demand analysis (e.g., Leibenstein 1950, Gaertner 1974,
Pollak 1976, Kapteyn, Van de Geer, Van de Stadt, and Wansbeek 1997, and Binder and Pesaran
2001), taxation and expenditure policy (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski 1978, Layard 1980, Oswald
1983, Ng 1987, Villar 1988, Blomquist 1993, Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000, and Abel 2005), equi-
librium and asset pricing (e.g., Abel 1990, Gal´ ı 1994, Abel 1999, Campbell and Cochrane 1999,
Chan and Kogan 2002, and Dupor and Liu 2003), labor search and wage determination (e.g.,
Frank 1984a and 1984b, Akerlof and Yellen 1990, Neumark and Postlewaite 1998, and Bowles
and Park 2005), growth (e.g., Carroll, Overland, and Weil 1997, Corneo and Jeanne 2001, and
Liu and Turnovsky 2005), and corporate investments (e.g., Goel and Thakor 2005).4
Theoretical Work Despite their intuitive appeal and empirical relevance, there is surprisingly
very little theoretical work on other-regarding preferences, and, in particular, on preferences of
agents who care about relative outcomes. We are only aware of the works of Ok and Ko¸ ckesen
(2000), Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001), Gul and Pesendorfer (2005), Karni and Safra (2002),
Neilson and Stowe (2004), Neilson (2006), Sandbu (2005), and Segal and Sobel (2007). Among
them, Ok and Ko¸ ckesen (2000) is the article closest to ours. They consider negative interde-
pendent preferences over income distributions x and provide an elegant axiomatization of the
relative income criterion xof (xo/x), where x is the society average income and f is a strictly in-
creasing function. In deriving their criterion, Ok and Ko¸ ckesen (2000) emphasize the distinction
in agents’ preferences over income distributions between relative and individual income eﬀects,
modelled by f (xo/x) and xo, respectively. This distinction is a special instance of the general
trade-oﬀ between private beneﬁts and social externalities we discussed before. In particular,
the ordinal logarithmic transformation of the criterion xof (xo/x) is a special case of Theorem
4Other rank/status concerns have been considered by many authors. See, for example, the following articles
(and the references therein): Weiss (1976), Jones (1984), Basu (1989), Baumol (1990), Robson (1992), Cole,
Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992), Fershtman and Weiss (1993), Bernheim (1994), Ireland (1994), Kolm (1995), Mui
(1995), Pesendorfer (1995), Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), Fershtman, Murphy, and Weiss (1996), Akerlof (1997),
Weiss and Fershtman (1998), Ball, Eckel, Grossman, and Zame (2001), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Sameulson
(2004), Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005), Rayo and Becker (2007).





















where decision makers only care about average outcomes.
A diﬀerent theoretical approach has been proposed by Michael and Becker (1973), Becker
(1974), and Stigler and Becker (1977) (see Lancaster 1966 for a related approach), in which utility
analysis is reformulated by considering basic needs as arguments of agents’ objective functions,
in place of market consumption goods.5 The latter are viewed as inputs in household production
functions, whose outputs are the basic needs. In contrast, in our economic applications of Section
9 we still regard market consumption goods as arguments of our objective functions, and the
role of emotions is to shape the objective functions’ form.
Finally, the theoretical studies of Samuelson (2004) and Rayo and Becker (2007b) investigate
the emergence of relative outcome concerns from an evolutionary point of view. They show
how it can be evolutionary optimal to build relative outcome eﬀects directly into the utility
functions. In particular, Samuelson proposes an information based explanation, where peers’
outcomes are regarded as an information source on the environment’s uncertainties, while in
Rayo and Becker’s analysis relative concerns emerge from the maximization of relative rather
than absolute measures of ﬁtness.
Other Social Emotions Other strands of literature consider diﬀerent social emotions, like,
for example, altruism and related feelings (e.g., desire for reciprocity and fairness) that arise
from concerns about peers’ well being (see, e.g., Levine, 1998, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000, Charness and Rabin, 2002, as well as the surveys of Fehr and Fischbacher,
2002, and Sobel, 2005). Although economic social emotions are related as they are all ultimately
determined by the peers’ material outcomes, altruism and other emotions caused by the peers’
well being are conceptually diﬀerent from the emotions that we study in this paper. In particular,
the behavioral axioms that we introduce to derive the preference functional (1) are motivated
and interpreted by relative outcome concerns, and not by other concerns determined by peers’
outcomes. No element in (1) represents, at least explicitly, the decision makers perceptions of
their peers well being.
That said, our analysis provides a framework in which it is possible to model, through
suitable modiﬁcations/adaptations of our behavioral axioms, other economically relevant social
emotions. For example, to further illustrate the scope of our framework in Section 10.6 we brieﬂy
show how to modify our behavioral axioms in order to model inequity aversion ` a la Fehr and
Schmidt (1999).
1.5 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminary notions, used
in Section 3 to state our basic axioms. Section 4 and 5 contain our main results; in particular,
in Section 4 we prove the private utility representation, while in Section 5 we derive the social
one. Section 6 considers few special cases of our representations. Sections 7 and 8 provide
behaviorally based conditions on the shapes of the elements of the representations. Section 9
5For example, Becker (1974) considers an objective function with the “need of distinction” as an argument
(with its associated emotion of envy). See Sobel (2005) for an overview and discussion of Becker’s approach.
9illustrates our representation with an economic applications. Finally, Section 10 discusses at
length some further conceptual issues relevant for our analysis that we did not discuss in the




We consider a standard Anscombe and Aumann (1963) style setting. Its basic elements are a
set S of states of nature, an algebra Σ of subsets of S called events, and a convex set C of
consequences.
We denote by o a given agent, our protagonist, and by N the non-empty, possibly inﬁnite,
set of all agents in o’s world that are diﬀerent from o himself, that is, the set of all his possible
peers (the “Joneses,” as they are often called in the literature).
We denote by ℘(N) the set of all ﬁnite subsets of N; notice that ∅ ∈ ℘(N). Throughout
the paper, I denotes an element of ℘(N), even where not stated explicitly (except in Section
9). For every I, we denote by Io the set I ∪ {o}; similarly, if j does not belong to I, we denote
by Ij the set I ∪ {j}.
A (simple) act is a Σ-measurable and ﬁnite-valued function from S to C. We denote by A





: I ∈ ℘(N), fo ∈ Ao, and fi ∈ Ai for each i ∈ I
	




describes the situation in which o
selects act fo and his peers in I select the acts fi.
When I is the empty set (i.e., o has no reference group of peers), we have f = (fo) and we
often will just write fo to denote such a “Robinson Crusoe” proﬁle.
Here it is important to observe how the outcomes obtained by the agents in each state of
nature do not depend on the acts chosen by the other agents.
The constant act taking value c in all states is still denoted by c. With the usual slight abuse
of notation, we thus identify C with the subset of the constant acts. The set of acts proﬁles





: I ∈ ℘(N), xo ∈ C ∩ Ao, and xi ∈ C ∩ Ai for each i ∈ I
	
.




∈ X such that xi = c for all
i ∈ Io.6
Throughout the paper (except in Section 9) we make the following structural assumption.
Assumption. Ao = A and each Ai contains all constant acts.
In other words, we assume that o can select any act and that his peers can, at least, select









∈ F and all s ∈ S.
6Similarly, cI denotes a constant (xi)i∈I.
102.2 Distributions
We now introduce distributions, which play a key role in the paper. Let A be any set, for
example a set of outcomes or payoﬀs. If I ∈ ℘(N) is not empty, set AI = ×i∈IA. Given a vector
e =(ei)i∈I ∈ AI, we denote by µe =
P




δei (a) = |{i ∈ I : ei = a}|.
In other words, µe (a) is the number of indices i, that is, of agents, that get the same element
a of A under the allocation e.
Let M(A) be the collection of all positive integer measures µ on A with ﬁnite support and





δei : I ∈ ℘(N) and ei ∈ A for all i ∈ I
)
.
In other words, M(A) is the set of all possible distributions of vectors e =(ei)i∈I in AI, while
I ranges in ℘(N).
Set pim(A) = A × M(A). For example, if A is a set of payoﬀs, pairs (z,µ) ∈ pim(A) are
understood to be of the form
(payoﬀ of o, distribution of peers’ payoﬀs).
A function % : pim(A) → R is diago-null if
%(z,nδz) = 0, ∀z ∈ A,0 ≤ n ≤ |N|. (2)
For example, when A is a set of outcomes, a diago-null function % is zero whenever o and all his
peers are getting the same outcome.
When A ⊆ R, the order structure of R makes it possible to introduce monotone distribution
functions. Speciﬁcally, given e ∈ RI,
Fe (t) = µe (−∞,t] = |{i ∈ I : ei ≤ t}|, and
Ge (t) = µe (t,∞) = |{i ∈ I : ei > t}| = |I| − Fe (t)
are the increasing and decreasing distribution functions of e, respectively.8
Given two vectors a =(ai)i∈I ∈ RI and b =(bj)j∈J ∈ RJ, we say that:
(i) µa upper dominates µb if Ga (t) ≥ Gb (t) for all t ∈ R,
(ii) µa lower dominates µb if Fa (t) ≤ Fb (t) for all t ∈ R,
(iii) µa stochastically dominates µb if µa both upper and lower dominates µb.
7We adopt the convention that any sum of no summands (i.e., over the empty set) is zero.
8When I = ∅, µe = 0 and so Fe = Ge = 0.
113 The Basic Axioms
Our main primitive notion is a binary relation %o on the set F that describes o’s preferences.








is the agent’s ranking among societies (peer groups). To ease notation, we will often just write
% instead of %o.
Axiom A. 1 (Weak Order) % is nontrivial, complete, and transitive.
Axiom A. 2 (Monotonicity) Let f,g ∈ F. If f (s) % g (s) for all s in S, then f % g.














Moreover, if the above relations are both strict, there exist α,β ∈ (0,1) such that








≺ (βc + (1 − β)c)Io .
These ﬁrst three axioms are standard. The Monotonicity Axiom requires that if an act
proﬁle f is, state by state, better than another act proﬁle g, then f % g. Note that in each state
the comparison is between social allocations, that is, between elements of X. In each state, o
is thus comparing outcome proﬁles, not just his own outcomes. In Section 10.3 we will further
discuss Axiom 2.
Axiom A. 4 (Independence) Let α in (0,1) and fo,go,ho in Ao. If (fo)  (go), then
(αfo + (1 − α)ho)  (αgo + (1 − α)ho).
This is a classic independence axiom, which we only require on “solo” preferences, with no
peers.
Axiom A. 5 (Conformistic Indiﬀerence) cIo ∼ cIo∪{j} for all c in C, I in ℘(N), and j not
in I.
According to this axiom, for agent o it does not matter if to an “egalitarian” group, where
everybody has the same outcome c, is added a further peer with, again, outcome c.
Axiom A.5 thus describes a very simple form of the trade-oﬀ, from the standpoint of the
preferences of o, between an increase in the size of the society and the change in the outcome
necessary to keep him indiﬀerent. In the representation this axiom translates into the condition
that the externality function % is zero when all members of the group have the same outcome.
Diﬀerent trade-oﬀs have a similar axiomatization. For example, if o prefers, for the same
outcome c, a smaller society, then a similar axiom would require that, for some improvement
over c, he would feel indiﬀerent between the smaller society with a less preferred outcome and a
larger one with better common outcome. With this more general axiom, the externality function
would also depend on the size of the group.9
9That is, in (2) we would have %(z,nδz) = φ(n), where φ : N → R is a suitable decreasing function.
12Axiom A.5 per se is especially appealing for large groups; in any case, we regard it as
a transparent and reasonable simplifying assumption, whose weakening would complicate the
derivation without a comparable beneﬁt for the interpretation.
The next ﬁnal basic axiom is an anonymity condition, which assumes that decision makers
do not care about the identity of who, among their peers, gets a given outcome. This condition
requires that only the distribution of outcomes matters, without any role for possible special ties
that decision makers may have with some of their peers. This allows to study relative outcomes
eﬀects in “purity,” without other concerns intruding into the analysis.








in X. If there is a bijection π : J → I









The basic axioms A.1-A.6 lead to our basic representation.
Lemma 1 A binary relation % on F satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.6 if and only if there exist a non-
constant aﬃne function u : C → R, a diago-null function % : pim(C) → R, and a probability P















represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
Moreover,

ˆ u, ˆ %, ˆ P

is another representation of % in the above sense if and only if ˆ P = P
and there exist α,β ∈ R with α > 0 such that ˆ u = αu + β and ˆ % = α%.
In this primitive, “mother,” representation relative outcome concerns are captured by the
externality function % : pim(C) → R, which depends on both agent’s o own outcome fo (s) and
on the distribution
P
i∈I δfi(s) of peers’ outcome. In fact, a pair (z,µ) ∈ pim(C) reads as
(outcome of o, distribution of peers’ outcomes).
All representations in the paper build on the basic representation (3) and they will be
characterized by speciﬁc properties of the function %, such as suitable monotonicity properties
in its arguments.




∈ F, there exists









4 The Private Utility Representation
In this section we present our ﬁrst representation, which models the private emotion discussed
in the Introduction.
The basic Axioms A.1-A.6 are common to our two main representations, the “private” and
the, more general, “social.” The next two axioms are, instead, peculiar to the private represen-
tation. They only involve deterministic act proﬁles, that is, elements of X.
10The existence of co is proved in Lemma 9 of Appendix 11.4, which also shows that Axioms A.1-A.5 give a
ﬁrst simple representation.
















∈ X and j / ∈ I.
Axiom B.1 is a key behavioral condition because it captures the negative dependence of
agent o welfare on his peers’ outcomes. In fact, according to Axiom B.1 the decision maker o
prefers, ceteris paribus, that a given peer j gets an outcome that he regards less valuable.






























Axiom B.2 is based on the idea that the presence of a society stresses the perceived diﬀerences
in consumption. In fact, interpreting xo as a gain and yo as a loss, the idea is that winning in
front of a society is better than winning alone, losing alone is better than loosing in front of
a society, and, “hence,” a ﬁfty-ﬁfty randomization of the better alternatives is preferred to a
ﬁfty-ﬁfty randomization of the worse ones.
We can now state the private utility representation, where we use the notation introduced
in Section 2.2.
Theorem 1 A binary relation % on F satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.6 and B.1-B.2 if and only if
there exist a non-constant aﬃne function u : C → R, a diago-null function % : pim(u(C)) → R
increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second



















represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).





are evaluated via agent’s o utility function u. In particular, %
depends on both agent o’s own payoﬀ u(fo (s)) and on the distribution
P
i∈I δu(fi(s)) of peers’
outcome, evaluated via u. This dependence is increasing in o’s payoﬀ and decreasing (w.r.t.
stochastic dominance) in the peers’ outcome distribution. This reﬂects the negative dependence
behaviorally modelled by Axiom B.1.
The preferences described by Theorem 1 can be represented by a triplet (u,%,P). Next we
give the uniqueness properties of this representation.
Proposition 1 Two triplets (u,%,P) and (ˆ u, ˆ %, ˆ P) represent the same relation % as in Theorem























145 The Social Value Representation
5.1 An Induced Order
Turn now to the possibility that agents might experience envy/pride feelings because of the
outcomes’ symbolic value. In fact, an object may be serviceable for the utility it provides to the
user abstracting from the social signal it sends; for instance, if the object is used completely in
private. But the social value is a diﬀerent evaluation.
To illustrate, consider the famous “silver spoon” example of Veblen (1899), which clearly
brings out the contrast between use and symbolic values of objects:
A hand-wrought silver spoon, of a commercial value of some ten to twenty dollars, is
not ordinarily more serviceable – in the ﬁrst sense of the word – than a machine-made
spoon of the same material. It may not even be more serviceable than a machine-
made spoon of some “base” metal, such as aluminum, the value of which may be no
more than some ten to twenty cents.
The conceptual structure we have developed so far allows us to make more precise and
behaviorally founded the classic Veblenian distinction. Speciﬁcally, we formalize this idea by
introducing an induced preference ˙ % on C, which will be represented by a social value function
v.
Deﬁnition 1 Given any c
¯
,¯ c ∈ C, say that
















∈ X and j / ∈ I.
In other words, we have ¯ c ˙ % c
¯
when in all possible societies to which the decision maker can
belong, he always prefers that, ceteris paribus, a given peer has c
¯
rather than ¯ c.
In particular, only peer j’s outcome changes in the comparison (7), while both the decision
maker’s own outcome xo and all other peer’s outcomes (xi)i∈I remain the same. The ranking
(7) thus reveals through choice behavior a negative outcome externality of j on o.
This negative externality can be due to the private emotion we discussed before; in this case
Axiom B.1 holds and the rankings % and ˙ % are then easily seen to agree on C (i.e., u = v in
the representation). More generally, however, this externality can be due to a cultural/symbolic
aspect of j’s outcome. For instance, the Veblen silver and aluminum spoons are presumably
ranked indiﬀerent by %, but not by ˙ %. That is, they have similar u values, but diﬀerent v values.
Summing up, we interpret ¯ c ˙ % c
¯
as revealing, via choice behavior, that our envious/proud
decision maker regards outcome ¯ c to be more socially valuable than c
¯
. If % and ˙ % do not agree
on C, this can be properly attributed to the outcomes’ symbolic value.
Remark 1 The relation ˙ % is trivial for conventional, asocial, decision makers because for them
















We now present few behavioral (and so testable) axioms needed for the social representation.
We begin with few simple axioms on the primitive preference % that will make the induced
preference ˙ % an independent and nontrivial weak order on C.
Axiom A. 7 (Group Invariance) Given any c,d ∈ C, if
(xo,(xi)i∈I,d{j})  (xo,(xi)i∈I,c{j}) (8)
for some (xo,(xi)i∈I) ∈ X and j / ∈ I, then there is no other (xo,(xi)i∈I) ∈ X and j / ∈ I such
that (xo,(xi)i∈I,c{j})  (xo,(xi)i∈I,d{j}).
This axiom requires that the decision maker be consistent across groups in his social ranking
of outcomes. This ranking is thus “absolute” and group invariant, that is, it does not depend on
the particular peers’ group in which the decision maker happens to make the comparison (8).
In terms of the representation, Axiom 7 implies that the function v does not depend on I.
Axiom 7 can be regarded as a group anonymity axiom, that is, it does not matter the par-
ticular group where a choice is made. Like the anonymity Axiom A.6, this condition guarantees
that only outcomes per se matter and it thus allows us to study in purity the relative outcomes
eﬀects, our main object of interest.
The following axiom guarantees that the preference ˙ % is nontrivial.
Axiom A. 8 (Nontriviality) There are c,d ∈ C, (xo,(xi)i∈I) ∈ X and j / ∈ I such that
(xo,(xi)i∈I,d{j})  (xo,(xi)i∈I,c{j}). (9)
The next two axioms just require standard independence and Archimedean conditions with
respect to a given peer j’s outcome. To ease notation, cαd denotes (1 − α)c + αd.
Axiom A. 9 (Outcome Independence) For all c,d,e ∈ C, (xo,(xi)i∈I) ∈ X, and j / ∈ I we
have
(xo,(xi)i∈I,c{j}) % (xo,(xi)i∈I,d{j}) =⇒ (xo,(xi)i∈I,cαe{j}) % (xo,(xi)i∈I,dαe{j}),
for all α ∈ (0,1).
Axiom A. 10 (Outcome Archimedean) If c,d,e ∈ C, (xo,(xi)i∈I) ∈ X, j / ∈ I, and
(xo,(xi)i∈I,c{j})  (xo,(xi)i∈I,d{j})  (xo,(xi)i∈I,e{j}),
then there exist α,β ∈ (0,1) such that
(xo,(xi)i∈I,cαe{j})  (xo,(xi)i∈I,d{j})  (xo,(xi)i∈I,cβe{j}).
Axioms A.7-A. 10 induce the following properties on ˙ %.
Lemma 2 The preference relation % satisﬁes axioms A.1 and A.7-A.10 if and only if ˙ % is
complete, transitive, nontrivial, Archimedean, and independent.
The ﬁnal axiom we need for the social representation is simply the social version of Axiom
B.2.





























We can now state our more general representation result.
Theorem 2 A binary relation % on F satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.11 if and only if there exist two
non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R, a diago-null function % : pim(v (C)) → R increasing
in the ﬁrst component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second one, and a



















represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
Relative to the private representation (5), there is now a non-constant aﬃne function v :
C → R that represents ˙ % and so quantiﬁes the social emotion. The function v replaces u in the
externality function %, and so here agent o evaluates with v both his own payoﬀ and the peers’
outcome. Like u, also v is a purely subjective construct because ˙ % is derived from the subjective
preference %. As such, it may depend solely on subjective considerations.
The preferences described by Theorem 2 are thus represented by a quadruple (u,v,%,P).
Next we give the uniqueness properties of this representation.
Proposition 2 Two quadruples (u,v,%,P) and (ˆ u, ˆ v, ˆ %, ˆ P) represent the same relations % and
˙ % as in Theorem 2 if and only if ˆ P = P and there exist α,β, ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with α, ˙ α > 0 such that

























∈ pim(ˆ v (C)).
5.3 Private vs Social
The fact that the preference functional (5) in Theorem 1 is a special case of (10) in Theorem
2 might suggest that Theorem 1 is a special case of Theorem 2. Because of the requirement in
Theorem 2 that v represents ˙ %, this is true provided u also represents ˙ %. That is, provided %
and ˙ % agree on C.
Notice that Axiom B.1 guarantees that % implies ˙ %. The converse implication is obtained
by strengthening Axiom B.1 as follows.
Axiom B. 3 (Strong Negative Dependence) % satisﬁes Axiom B.1 and, if the ﬁrst rela-




∈ X and j / ∈ I.
This axiom thus requires that the agent be “suﬃciently sensible to externalities.”
Proposition 3 Let % on F be a binary relation that satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.6. The following
statements are equivalent:
17(i) % satisﬁes Axioms A.7-A.10 and B.1;
(ii) % satisﬁes Axiom B.3;
(iii) % coincides with ˙ % on C.
Remark 2 If % is represented as in Theorem 1, then Axiom B.3 is clearly satisﬁed whenever %
is strictly increasing in the second component (w.r.t. stochastic dominance). On the contrary,
if % ≡ 0 we are in the standard expected utility case: Axiom B.1 is satisﬁed, while Axiom B.3 is
violated.
As already observed, Axiom B.1 guarantees that ˙ % coarser than %. Next example shows
that this can happen in nontrivial ways.
Example 1 Assume |S| = |N| = 1 and C = R, and consider the preferences on F represented
by
V (xo) = xo,






for all xo,x−o ∈ R. They have a natural interpretation: there is a “poverty line” at 0 and
agents do not care about peers below that line. Using Theorem 1, it is easy to check that these
preferences satisfy Axioms A.1-A.6 and B.1-B.2. Moreover, it is easy to check that Axiom B.3
is violated. In fact, % coincides on R with the usual order, while ˙ % is trivial on R− and is the
usual order on R+ (Proposition 3 implies that Axiom B.3 is violated).
6 Special Cases
We consider three special cases of Theorem 2. In the ﬁrst one only the peers’ average social
payoﬀ matters, as often assumed in empirical work. In the second one, only the peers’ maximum
and minimum social payoﬀs matter. In the last special case we consider separately the peers
who have socially higher payoﬀs than the decision maker o from those that, instead, have worse
payoﬀs. In this way we can separate invidia (envy) eﬀects from superbia (pride) ones.
6.1 Average Payoﬀ




an element of X. Intuitively, an n-replica of  
xo,(xi)i∈I

is a society in which each agent i in I has spawned n − 1 clones of himself, each
with the same endowment xi.













where {Ji}i∈I is a class of disjoint subsets of N with |Ji| = n for all i ∈ I.11
























, ∀n ∈ N.




























xo,(αyi + (1 − α)wi)i∈I











xo,(βyi + (1 − β)zi)i∈I






Axioms A.12 and A.13 say, respectively, that the agent’s preferences are not reversed either
by an n-replica of the societies (xi)i∈I and (yi)i∈I or by a randomization with a common society
(wi)i∈I.
Next we have a standard continuity axiom.












∈ X, the sets

α ∈ [0,1] :
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α ∈ [0,1] :
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To state our result we need some notation. The natural version of diago-nullity for a function
% on K × (K ∪ {∞}) requires that %(z,z) = 0 = %(z,∞) for all z ∈ K.12 Moreover, a function
ϕ : K → R is continuously decreasing if it is a strictly increasing transformation of a continuous
and decreasing function ψ : K → R.13
If we add Axioms A.12-A.14 to those in Theorem 2, then we obtain the following represen-
tation:
Theorem 3 Let N be inﬁnite. A binary relation % on F satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.14 if and
only if there exist two non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R, a diago-null function % :
v (C)×(v (C) ∪ {∞}) → R increasing in the ﬁrst component and continuously decreasing in the





















represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
In the representation (11) decision makers only care about the average social value |I|
−1 P
i∈I v (fi (s)).





















where only the average outcome appears, as it is the case in many speciﬁcations used in ap-
plications. It is also possible to give behavioral conditions, omitted for brevity, such that
%(z,t) = γ (z − t) for some increasing γ : R → R with γ (0) = 0.
Finally, as to uniqueness, we have:
12Here K is a nontrivial interval and we adopt the convention 0/0 = ∞.
13For example, strictly decreasing functions ϕ (= ¯ ϕ ◦ (−id) where ¯ ϕ(t) = ϕ(−t) for all t) and continuous
decreasing functions ϕ (= id ◦ ϕ) are clearly continuously decreasing, while decreasing step functions are not
(unless they are constant).
19Proposition 4 Two quadruples (u,v,%,P) and (ˆ u, ˆ v, ˆ %, ˆ P) represent the same relations % and
˙ % as in Theorem 3 if and only if ˆ P = P and there exist α,β, ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with α, ˙ α > 0 such that
ˆ u = αu + β, ˆ v = ˙ αv + ˙ β, and
ˆ %(z,r) = α%
 
z − ˙ β
˙ α
,
r − ˙ β
˙ α
!
for all (z,r) ∈ ˆ v (C) × (ˆ v (C) ∪ {∞}).
6.2 Maximum and Minimum Payoﬀs
In some cases, agents might only care about the best and worst outcomes that their peers get,
rather than the entire distribution of outcomes. This property is captured by the next axiom.









(i) for all i ∈ I there is j ∈ J such that yj ˙ % xi,










The intuition here is that, for a ﬁxed “level of consumption” of o, in society (yj)j∈J is more
diﬃcult to keep up with the Joneses (point (i)), while in society (xi)i∈I is easier to stay ahead
of them (point (ii)).
Given a non-singleton interval K ⊆ R, set
K1,2 = {(z,r,t) ∈ K × K × K : r ≤ t} ∪ (K × {+∞} × {−∞}).
Diago-nullity on K1,2 takes the form %(z,z,z) = 0 = %(z,+∞,−∞) for all z ∈ K, with the
conventions min∅ = +∞ and max∅ = −∞.
Theorem 4 Let |N| > 1. A binary relation % on F satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.11 and C.1 if
and only if there exist two non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R, a diago-null function
% : v (C)
1,2 → R, increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing in the second and third ones





















represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
In the representation (12) only the best and worst values mini∈I v (fi (s)) and maxi∈I v (fi (s))
are relevant for the decision maker o. Here uniqueness takes the following form:
Proposition 5 Two quadruples (u,v,%,P) and (ˆ u, ˆ v, ˆ %, ˆ P) represent the same relations % and
˙ % as in Theorem 4 if and only if ˆ P = P and there exist α,β, ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with α, ˙ α > 0 such that
ˆ u = αu + β, ˆ v = ˙ αv + ˙ β, and
ˆ %(z,r,R) = α%
 
z − ˙ β
˙ α
,
r − ˙ β
˙ α
,
R − ˙ β
˙ α
!
for all (z,r,R) ∈ ˆ v (C)
1,2.
206.3 Separating Invidia and Superbia
The previous special case suggests to consider an agent who, in a given reference society, considers
separately those who socially dominate him and those who are socially dominated.14 Next
Axiom D.1 describes an agent whose welfare decreases when a dominant element joins the
society (invidia), while it increases if a dominated element joins it (superbia).




∈ X, j / ∈ I, and c ∈ C.

















If K is an interval of real numbers, we denote by pid(K) the set of triplets (z,µ,µ0) such
that z ∈ K, µ and µ0 are positive integer measures ﬁnitely supported in K ∩ (−∞,z) and
K ∩[z,∞), with (µ + µ0)(K) ≤ |N|. The elements of pid(K) are understood to be (payoﬀ to o,
distribution of dominated payoﬀs, distribution of dominant payoﬀs) triplets. The natural version
of the deﬁnition of diago-nullity for a function % deﬁned on pid(K) requires that %(z,0,nδz) = 0
for all z ∈ K and 0 ≤ n ≤ |N|.
Theorem 5 A binary relation % on F satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.11 and D.1 if and only if there
exist two non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R, a diago-null function % : pid(v (C)) → R
increasing in the ﬁrst component, decreasing in the second and third components (w.r.t. lower
























represents % on F and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
In this ﬁnal special case we separate the peers’ that have socially higher payoﬀs v (fi (s)) ≥
v (fo (s)) from those that have worst ones v (fi (s)) < v (fo (s)). Suitable speciﬁcations of % then
model diﬀerent attitudes of the decision makers toward the former and the latter payoﬀs.
Proposition 6 Two quadruples (u,v,%,P) and (ˆ u, ˆ v, ˆ %, ˆ P) represent the same relations % and
˙ % as in Theorem 5 if and only if ˆ P = P and there exist α,β, ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with α, ˙ α > 0 such that




















δ ˙ α−1(zi− ˙ β),
X
j∈J











∈ pid(ˆ v (C)).
As a ﬁnal remark, observe that if in Axiom D.1 c ˙ %xo and c ˙ ≺xo are replaced by, respectively,









respectively. Relative to the original version, this variation of Axiom D.1 captures diﬀerent at-
titudes towards the addition of an agent with the “same” outcome as o.




∈ X is such that mini∈I v (xi) ≤ v (xo) ≤ maxi∈I v (xi).
217 Behavioral Attitudes
The axiomatization of preferences given in the ﬁrst two basic theorems opens now the way to a
behavioral foundation of the analysis of preferences. In this section we assume that % satisﬁes
Axioms A.1-A.14, so that the representation (11) holds.
It is sometimes useful to consider attitudes that hold “locally,” on subsets of C. For this
reason, throughout this section we denote by D a convex subset of C. An event E ∈ Σ is




E¯ c for some ¯ c c
¯
in C, representation (11) guarantees that this
amounts to say that the agent assigns probability 1/2 to event E.
7.1 Social Loss Aversion
An outcome proﬁle where your peers get a socially better outcome than yours can be viewed as
social loss; conversely, a proﬁle where you get more than them can be viewed as a social gain.
This taxonomy is important because individuals might well have diﬀerent attitudes toward such
social gains and losses, similarly to what happens for standard private gains and losses.
We say that a preference % is more envious than proud (or averse to social losses), relative
to an ethically neutral event E, a convex set D ⊆ C, and a given xo ∈ D, if
(xo,xo) % (xo,xiEyi) (14)
for all xi,yi ∈ D such that (1/2)xi + (1/2)yi ˙ ∼ xo. The intuition is that agent o tends to be
more frustrated by envy than satisﬁed by pride (or, assuming w.l.o.g. xi ˙ % yi, he is more scared
by the social loss (xo,xi) than lured by the social gain (xo,yi)).
Proposition 7 If % admits a representation (11), then % is more envious than proud, relative
to an ethically neutral event E, a convex D ⊆ C, and xo ∈ D if and only if
%(v (xo),v (xo) + h) ≤ −%(v (xo),v (xo) − h) (15)
for all h ≥ 0 such that v (xo) ± h ∈ v (D). In particular,15
D+%(v (xo),v (xo)) ≤ D−%(v (xo),v (xo)). (16)
provided v (xo) ∈ int(v (D)).
An immediate implication of Proposition 7 is that, given D and xo, % is more envious than
proud relatively to an ethically neutral event E if and only if it is more envious than proud
relatively to any other ethically neutral event. In other words, the choice of E is immaterial in
the deﬁnition of social loss aversion.
7.2 Social Risk Aversion
More generally, decision makers may dislike uncertainty about their peers’ social standing. This
suggests to strenghten the notion we just discussed as follows. Say that a preference % is averse
to social risk, relatively to an ethically neutral event E, a convex set D ⊆ C, and a given xo ∈ C,
if
(xo,wi) % (xo,xiEyi) (17)
15Here D+%(r,r) = liminf h↓0
%(r,r+h)−%(r,r)
h and D−%(r,r) = liminf h↑0
%(r,r+h)−%(r,r)
h .
22for all xi,yi,wi ∈ D such that (1/2)xi + (1/2)yi ˙ ∼ wi. Notice that the previous deﬁnition of
being more envious than proud requires that (17) holds only for wi = xo.16
The next result characterizes social risk aversion in terms of concavity of %.
Proposition 8 If % admits a representation (11), then % is averse to social risk, relative to an
ethically neutral event E, a convex D ⊆ C, and xo ∈ C if and only if %(v (xo),·) is concave on
v (D).
Propensity to social risk is deﬁned analogously, and characterized by convexity of %(v (xo),·)
on v (D). More importantly, the standard analysis of risk attitudes applies to our more general
“social” setting: for example, coeﬃcients of social risk aversion can be studied and compared.
Similarly to what happened for social loss aversion, also here it is immediate to see that the
choice of E in the deﬁnition of social risk aversion is immaterial.
8 Comparative Interdependence
Next we show that in the very general context of preferences represented as in Lemma 1, and
in particular, in all the special cases we considered so far, comparative attitudes are determined
by the externality function %. In this section we consider two preferences %1 and %2 on F both
satisfying A.1-A.6, and we denote by un : C → R and %n : pim(C) → R the two functions
representing %n in the sense of the basic representation (3) for n = 1,2.
8.1 Aversion to Social Ranking
A decision maker is more averse to social ranking than another one if he has more to lose (in













∈ X and c ∈ C. In other words, %1 is more ranking averse than %2 if,
whenever %1 prefers a possibly unequal social proﬁle to an egalitarian one, then the same is true
for %2.17
Proposition 9 Given two preferences %1 and %2 on F that satisfy Axioms A.1-A.6, the fol-
lowing conditions are equivalent:18
(i) %1 is more ranking averse than %2,
(ii) u1 ≈ u2 and (provided u1 = u2) %1 ≤ %2.
16A more general deﬁnition of social risk aversion can be actually given, without requiring that E is ethically
neutral, but just essential. See Appendix 11.4 for details.
17Mutatis mutandis, the use of egalitarian proﬁles as benchmarks for equality makes this comparative notion
similar in spirit to how Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) deﬁne comparative ambiguiy aversion by using constant
acts as benchmark unambiguous acts.
18Recall that u1 ≈ u2 means that there exist α > 0 and β ∈ R such that u1 = αu2 + β.
23A Closer Look Let us have a closer look at ranking aversion. First observe that, by the ﬁrst
part of (ii) of Proposition 9, if two preferences %1 and %2 can be ordered by ranking aversion,
then they are outcome equivalent; that is, they agree on the set C (precisely, on {(c) : c ∈ C}).
If we consider the preferences on the set of all outcome proﬁles, we can then see that com-
parability according to ranking aversion can be decomposed in two components:

















%2 yo 2 xo.
Condition (a) says that, if a society (xi)i∈I makes the decision maker 2 dissatisﬁed of his
outcome xo, then it makes 1 dissatisﬁed too. In this case we say that %1 is more envious than
%2.
Similarly, (b) means that every time the decision maker 1 prefers to have the intrinsically
inferior outcome xo in a society (xi)i∈I than the superior yo in solitude (or in an egalitarian
society), then the same is true for 2. In this case we say that %1 is less proud than %2.
The next result shows how ranking aversion can be expressed in terms of the two behavioral
traits we just described.
Proposition 10 Given two preferences %1 and %2 on F that satisfy Axioms A.1-A.6, the
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) %1 is more ranking averse than %2,
(ii) %1 is outcome equivalent to %2, more envious, and less proud.
8.2 Social Sensitivity
Decision makers are more socially sensitive when they have more at stake, in subjective terms,
from social comparisons; intuitively, they are at the same time more envious and more proud.19
Next we show that this notion of social sensitivity is characterized in the representation
through a ranking of the absolute values of %.
Proposition 11 Given two preferences %1 and %2 on F that satisfy Axioms A.1-A.6, the
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) %1 is outcome equivalent to %2, more envious, and more proud,
(ii) u1 ≈ u2 and (provided u1 = u2) |%1| ≥ |%2| and %1%2 ≥ 0.
9 Social Economics
We now investigate some economic consequences of our axiomatic analysis. We ﬁrst introduce
a two-period storage economy where agents have our social preferences. We then specialize this
economy in order to focus on two distinct important economic phenomena that arise with our
preferences, that is, overconsumption/workaholism and conformism/anticonformism.









%1 yo 1 xo.
24We consider economies with a continuum of individually negligible agents, for two main
reasons: it simpliﬁes an already complicated derivation and it allows to abstract from strate-
gic interactions among agents that might otherwise arise, so that we can better focus on the
interdependencies due to the social dimension of preferences.
Formally, the set I of agents is a complete nonatomic probability space (I,Λ,λ). In partic-
ular, we denote by Mn the collection of all Λ-measurable functions φ : I → Rn and by Ln the
subset of Mn consisting of bounded functions.
9.1 A Storage Economy
There is a single consumption good, which can be either consumed or saved. We consider a
storage economy, in which a storage technology is available that allows agents to store for their
own future consumption any amount of the consumption good they do not consume in the ﬁrst
period.
As we will see momentarily, in the storage economy there is no room for trade: each agent
produces, consumes, and saves/stores for his own future consumption. There are no markets
and prices, and, with conventional asocial objective functions, this economy is in equilibrium
(Deﬁnition 2) when agents just solve their individual intertemporal problems (19).
As a result, it is an equilibrium notion limited in scope, with no need of considering any
form of mutual compatibility of agents’ choices. If, however, agents have our social objective
functions, this is no longer the case. In fact, when agents’ own consumption choices are aﬀected
by their peers’ choices, a link among all such choices naturally emerges. Even without any
trading, in this case there is a sensible notion of mutual compatibility of the agents’ choices and,
therefore, a more interesting equilibrium notion becomes appropriate (Deﬁnition 3).
In storage economies, therefore, interaction among agents is only due to the social dimen-
sion of consumption. This allows us to study the equilibrium eﬀects of this social dimension
in “purity,” without other factors intruding into the analysis. This is why we consider these
economies. Later, in Subsection 9.4, we will brieﬂy discuss a market economy.
We turn now to the formal model. We assume that the storage technology gives a real (gross)
return R > 0.
Agents live two periods and in each of them they work and consume; in period one they can
also store. In the ﬁrst period each agent i selects a consumption/eﬀort pair (ci,0,ei,0) ∈ R2
+,
evaluated by a utility function ui : R2
+ → R. Eﬀort is transformed in consumption good
according to an individual production function Fi,0 : R+ → R+.
In the second period there is technological uncertainty, described by a stochastic production
function Fi,s : R+ → R+ that depends on a ﬁnite space S of states of Nature, endowed with a
probability P. With the usual abuse of notation we set S = {1,2,...,S} and S0 = {0,1,2,...,S},
and we write ps instead of P (s). The production functions {Fi,s}s∈S0 use a physical capital,
whose amount is exogenously ﬁxed in each period and state (capital accumulation is thus not
studied here).
In the second period too, each agent i works and consumes. He thus selects in each state s a
consumption/eﬀort pair (ci,s,ei,s) ∈ R2
+, again evaluated by the same utility function ui of the
ﬁrst period.
Finally, eﬀort is a limited resource: for each i there is a vector hi ∈ RS+1
+ such that ei,s
cannot exceed hi,s for all s ∈ S0.





Ui (ci,ei) ≡ ui (ci,0,ei,0) + β
X
s∈S
psui(ci,s,ei,s), ∀(ci,ei) ∈ RS+1
+ × RS+1
+ ,
and Bi is the subset of RS+1
+ × RS+1
+ consisting of all (ci,ei) such that:




(ii) ci,0 ≤ Fi,0 (ei,0);
(iii) ci,s = Fi,s (ei,s) + R(Fi,0 (ei,0) − ci,0) for all s ∈ S.
Since in every period and state each agent can consume all he produces, then Bi is never
empty.
We make a ﬁrst assumption on the storage economy.
H.1 For each agent i ∈ I:
(i) ui : R2
+ → R is continuous.
(ii) Fi,s : R+ → R+ is increasing and continuous for all s ∈ S0.
This assumption guarantees that the (nonempty) set Bi is compact, and that the objective
function Ui is continuous. By the Weierstrass Theorem, problem (19) thus admits a solution.
Say that a consumption/eﬀort proﬁle (c,e) ∈ MS+1 ×MS+1 is feasible if (ci,ei) ∈ Bi for all
i ∈ I.




i) ≥ Ui (ci,ei), ∀(ci,ei) ∈ Bi,
for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
As we mentioned before, this equilibrium notion just requires that agents individually solve
their problems (19), with no interaction whatsoever among themselves.
We turn now to our social preferences. Assume that the preferences of our agents are
represented by the preference functional (11), with %i (r,t) = γi (r − t), where γi : R → R is an
increasing function with γi (0) = 0. Given a common social value function v : R+→ R, the social
objective function Vi of each agent now depends on the entire proﬁles of consumption and eﬀort,
as follows:




















for all (c,e) ∈ LS+1
+ × LS+1
+ .20 Here we are assuming that only consumption has a social
dimension, while eﬀort (and leisure) is only valued privately. This was a classic assumption
20Next assumption H.2.i guarantees that all feasible consumption eﬀort/proﬁles are bounded.
26in Veblen’s analysis, and is justiﬁed by the lower degree of observability of eﬀort relative to
consumption. For this reason, eﬀort is not an argument of the function γ.21
The equilibrium notion relevant for our social preferences is a Nash equilibrium for a con-
tinuum of agents.
Deﬁnition 3 A feasible consumption/eﬀort proﬁle (c∗,e∗) ∈ LS+1×LS+1 is a social equilibrium
for the storage economy if






, ∀(ci,ei) ∈ Bi, (20)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
This equilibrium notion requires a mutual compatibility of agents’ choices and is thus quali-
tatively very diﬀerent from that of Deﬁnition 2, a diﬀerence entirely due to the social dimension
of our preferences.
A key theoretical issue is the existence of social equilibria. To prove this, we need the
following mild assumption. Point (i) says that the eﬀort and production capacities are limited,
while the other points are standard assumptions.
H.2 The following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) supi∈I (Fi,s (hi,s) + hi,s) < ∞ for all s ∈ S0.
(ii) γi : R → R is increasing and continuous, with γi (0) = 0, for all i ∈ I.
(iii) the real valued functions u(·) (x,y), h(·),s, F(·),s (z), and γ(·) (t) are Λ-measurable on I
for each ﬁxed (x,y,z,t) ∈ R3
+ × R and s ∈ S0.
(iv) v : R+ → R is increasing and continuous.
We can now prove a general existence result for storage economies. The proof is based on
Schmeidler (1973) and Balder (1995).
Theorem 6 In a storage economy satisfying assumptions H.1 and H.2 there exists a social
equilibrium.
9.2 Consumerism: Overconsumption and Workaholism
The ﬁrst phenomenon we consider is how overconsumption and workaholism can arise in a
social equilibrium. This is an often mentioned behavioral consequence of concerns for relative
consumption and here Proposition 12 shows how it emerges in our general analysis.22
We focus on a single period version of the storage economy. In fact, as pointed out in
the Introduction, trade-oﬀs arise in more general intertemporal settings (i.e., consuming more
today leads to lower saving and, possibly, to lower future consumption). The tendency to
overconsumption and workaholism that here we identify in the single period setting might be
then oﬀset by other forces.
21In Section 10.4 we discuss in some more detail the case in which there are both outcomes that are socially
valued (e.g., consumption here) and outcomes that are only privately valued (e.g., eﬀort here).
22Empirical evidence on this phenomenon can be found, for example, in the labor economics papers mentioned
in the Introduction (see, e.g. Bowles and Park 2005 for a recent study). Recent anecdotal evidence is reported in
Rivlin (2007), who describes Silicon Valley workaholic executives as “working class millionaires.”
27To ease notation, we drop the subscripts 0; that is, ci and ei stand for ci,0 and ei,0, respec-







+ : 0 ≤ ei ≤ hi, ci = Fi (ei)
	
.
Here a feasible consumption/eﬀort proﬁle (c∗,e∗) ∈ L×L is an asocial equilibrium if (c∗
i,e∗
i)
is a solution of problem (21) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
H.3 For each agent i ∈ I:
(i) ui is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on R2
++, ∂ui/∂x > 0, and the Hessian matrix
∇2ui is negative deﬁnite.
(ii) Fi is twice diﬀerentiable on R++, F0
i > 0 and F00
i < 0.
Lemma 3 If H.1, H.2, and H.3 hold, then there exists a (λ-a.e.) unique asocial equilibrium
(ˆ c, ˆ e).
Social objective functions Vi take the form








and a feasible pair (c∗,e∗) ∈ L × L is a social equilibrium if (20) holds.
To state the result we need a condition and some notation. The special form that Bi has in
this case guarantees that a consumption/eﬀort proﬁle (c,e) ∈ M × M is feasible if and only if
ei ∈ [0,hi] and ci = Fi (ei) for all i ∈ I. Under H.2.i, feasible proﬁles are thus determined by
eﬀort proﬁles that belong to the supnorm closed and convex set E = {e ∈ L : 0 ≤ e ≤ h}. The
value of the social objective function can be thus written as
Wi (e) = ui (Fi (ei),ei) + γi






∀e ∈ E,i ∈ I. (22)
An equilibrium (c∗,e∗) is internal if e∗ ∈ intE and strongly Pareto ineﬃcient if it is strongly
Pareto dominated, that is, there is ε > 0 and a feasible (c,e) ∈ M × M such that
Vi (c,e) ≥ Vi (c∗,e∗) + ε
for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
We can now state the needed assumption.
H.4 The following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) v is diﬀerentiable on R++ and v0 > 0.
(ii) γi is diﬀerentiable on R for all i ∈ I, and inf(i,t)∈I×R γ0
i (t) > 0.
(iii) sup
|x|,|y|,|t|≤n,i∈I
|ui(x,y) + γi (t)| < ∞ and sup
|x|≤n,i∈I
|v0(x) + F0
i (x)| < ∞
for all n ∈ N,23
23This implies W (E) consists of bounded functions.
28(iv) W : E → L is strictly diﬀerentiable on intE.24
Proposition 12 If H.1-H.4 hold, then internal social equilibria are strongly Pareto ineﬃcient
and exhibit overconsumption and workaholism.25
Overconsumption and workaholism thus characterize equilibria in the single period version
of the storage economy. We studied here in detail the Pareto ineﬃciency of the equilibria to
stress the negative features of these equilibria.
This result conﬁrms a well known intuition about social preferences. The next section will
show a genuine novel economic insight of our analysis.
9.3 Conformism and Anticonformism
We now study how conformism and anticonformism can characterize the consumption choices
of agents in social equilibria, depending, as anticipated in the Introduction, on whether either
envy or pride prevails among agents.
Since the rise of anticonformism is our main interest, in order to better focus on this issue
we consider a version of the storage economy in which agents are identical (so that the social
dimension of their preferences is the only possible cause of heterogeneous consumption choices).
We also assume that labor is supplied inelastically, say ei,s = ¯ es > 0 for all i ∈ I and s ∈ S0. To
ease notation, we set F0 (¯ e0) = ¯ x0 > 0 and Fs (¯ es) = ¯ xs > 0, and we drop eﬀort as argument of
the utility function u.







psu(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − ci))
!
. (23)
Deﬁne U : [0, ¯ x0] → R by U (ci) = u(ci) + β
P
s∈S psu(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − ci)) for all ci ∈ [0, ¯ x0]. A
(ﬁrst period) consumption proﬁle c ∈ M is feasible if it belongs to the set
C = {c ∈ M : 0 ≤ c ≤ ¯ x0},
and is an asocial equilibrium if ci solves problem (23) for λ-almost all i ∈ I. Clearly, all asocial
equilibria are symmetric (i.e., constant λ-almost everywhere) provided U is unimodal.
H.5 The following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) u : R+ → R is continuous on R+, strictly concave, strictly increasing, and diﬀeren-
tiable on (0,+∞).
(ii) U0
+ (0) > 0 > U0
− (¯ x0).
Lemma 4 If H.5 holds, then there exists a (λ-a.e.) unique asocial internal equilibrium.
24See Clarke [39, pages 30-32] for the properties of strict diﬀerentiabilitys.
25That is, λ-a.e., c
∗
i > ˆ ci and e
∗
i > ˆ ei, where (c
∗,e
∗) and (ˆ c, ˆ e) are, respectively, social and asocial consumption
and eﬀort equilibrium pairs.
29Given γ : R → R and v : R+→ R and c ∈ C, agent i’s social objective function becomes
Vi (c) = u(ci) + β
X
s∈S
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for all ci ∈ [0, ¯ x0] and for λ-almost
all i ∈ I.
We will use the following assumption.
H.6 The following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) v : R+ → R is continuous, concave, and strictly increasing on R+.
(ii) γ : R → R is increasing and γ (0) = 0.
We can now state the main result of the section. We consider two specular cases, one in
which agents exhibit pure envy, that is, γ (t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, and one in which they exhibit
pure pride, that is, γ (t) = 0 for all t ≤ 0. We show that envy leads to conformism, that is, all
social equilibria are symmetric, while pride leads to diversity, that is, all social equilibria are
asymmetric.
Theorem 7 Suppose assumptions H.5 and H.6 hold. Then:
(i) All social equilibria are asymmetric provided γ (t) = 0 for all t ≤ 0 and D+γ (0) > 0.
(ii) All social equilibria are symmetric provided γ (t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, and D+γ (t) > 0 for all
t < 0.
Moreover, in case (ii), D−γ (0) = 0 implies that the asocial symmetric equilibrium is the
unique social equilibrium.
As we remarked in the Introduction, the diversity in consumption behavior caused by pride
is the most remarkable part of the result because agents are identical. By point (i) of Theorem
7, in all equilibria necessarily some agents will choose to consume more today , that is, to have a
dominant position today, while other agents will choose the opposite, that is, they will save more
today in order to consume more tomorrow and have then a dominant position. This diversity
in equilibrium behavior is entirely due to the social dimension of preferences.
9.4 A Market Economy: Autarky and Trade
In the storage economy there was no room for trade. A simple modiﬁcation of the storage
economy that allows trade is to change the “saving technology” by assuming that agents no
longer can store the consumption good for future consumption. They can, however, borrow and
lend amounts of the consumption good, which is now also a real asset. Agents can save by
lending any amount of the consumption good that they do not consume in the ﬁrst period. As
a result, in the (real) asset economy agents interact by trading in the real asset market.
Though for brevity we do not study in detail this economy, it is worth observing that here
conformism/anticonformism correspond to no trade/trade. In fact, conformism means that all
social equilibria are symmetric, and, by the market clearing condition, it is easy to see that in
30such equilibria there is no trade in the real asset market. In contrast, this market operates in
the asymmetric equilibria of the anticonformism case. As a result, in this market economy, envy
leads to autarky, pride to trade.
10 Discussion
10.1 A Regret Interpretation
The theory we have presented is a theory of social emotions like envy and pride. It allows,
however, a close comparison with of social emotions private emotions like regret. This is clear
if we consider again the representation (1) in a diﬀerent light.
For this interpretation, consider again fo as the act chosen by the decision maker. Suppose
now that the acts (fi)i∈I) are acts that were available to him, but that he did not choose.
When the state s is revealed, the decision maker also knows the outcome of those acts, and
can formulate the counterfactual thought of the utility that he would have had he chosen, say
a fi instead of fo. The representation (1) gives the ex ante value of the vector (fo,fi)i∈I as the
combination of two components: the expected utility of the chosen act fo, and the expected
regret that will follow from the comparison state by state between the outcome fo(s) and the
vector of outcomes (fi(s))i∈I.26
By doing this the decision maker exhibits myopic behavior in that he forgets, in his ex post
evaluation of the act fi at s, the diﬀerent outcomes that this act would have delivered in diﬀerent
states. In this way a representation is given to a preference order not over societies, but rather
over acts proﬁles: the distinctive act fo is the chosen one, the others are the acts that were
available and not chosen. This interpretation is reasonable only in the case in which v = u, that
is, for the private utility representation (5).
This connection between envy and regret is particularly useful in experimental work because
it provides a way to test one of our main hypothesis, that envy may be the result of the
combination of social and private components.
The axioms that we have presented for the representation (5) can be reinterpreted in this
regret interpretation of our setting. The interpretation of the ﬁrst set of axioms A.1-A.4 (Weak
Order, Monotonicity, Archimedean, and Independence) is very similar to the one given for the
social interpretation, and needs no further comment.
The other axioms need a separate discussion. Conformistic Indiﬀerence (axiom A. 5) requires
that regret or relief are not possible when all the acts available deliver the same consequence,
independently of their number. Anonimity (axiom A. 6) is the requirement that the labeling of
non obtained consequences is irrelevant. Negative Dependence (axiom B. 1) is the axiom that
makes the analysis a theory of regret: for any given proﬁle of outcomes, if we make one of the
unobtained ones better, the resulting outcome proﬁle is less preferred. Comparative Preference
(axiom B. 2) requires that the presence of unobtained outcomes stresses the perceived diﬀerence
in the obtained outcome. For a given gain and loss, a gain facing alternative outcomes is better
than a gain without them, and the same for a loss.
The similarity of the interpretation of the axioms in the private and social environment
should not hide a deep conceptual diﬀerence between the two, which becomes clear when we
consider constant acts. In a social environment the preference order between 10 dollars to you
and 5 to the other over 10 dollars to you and 15 to the other is clear, and can be made an
26This combination between expected utility and expected regret reminds of the representation in Sarver (2005).
31object of choice, for example in an experiment. In a private environment, the comparison is now
between 10 dollars obtained and 5 dollars that could have obtained, versus 10 dollars obtained
and 15 dollars that could have obtained. A preference order can be inferred with hypothetical
questions, but the elicitation by choice is problematic: When the real choice is among constant
acts, the subject would never ﬁnd himself in the second alternative of the choice of 10 dollars
obtained when 15 were available. In other words, the regret interpretation is problematic from
a revealed preference standpoint (see Section 10.7).
10.2 Related Speciﬁcations
To further illustrate our choice criterion (1), we now compare it with other speciﬁcations used
in the large empirical literature on relative consumption and income eﬀects discussed in the
Introduction.




. The following func-












has been widely used in empirical work, where ¯ x is the average outcome (say consumption or
income).














In fact, the ratio xo/¯ x captures the externality determined by relative outcome concerns; that
is, it plays the same role of the function % in (1). What is altogether missing in the speciﬁcation
(24) is the term u(xo) of (25), that is, the expected utility
R
S u(fo (s))dP (s) in the general
representation (1).
As a result, the speciﬁcation (24) and its variations – with, for example, ratios replaced by
diﬀerences27 – model decision makers who are only concerned about relative outcome eﬀects,
and their own outcomes are only valued in that regard. There is no speciﬁc role, instead, for the
private emotions determined by the outcomes’ intrinsic properties, which in our representation
(25) are modelled by the term u(xo), which is missing in (24). As a result, the speciﬁcation
(24) overlooks the basic trade-oﬀ between absolute and relative eﬀects that we discussed in the
Introduction and is, therefore, a signiﬁcant deviation from standard theory (which is not even
a special case of (24)).
To see more concretely the exclusive focus of (24) on relative eﬀects, consider a given proﬁle  
xo,(xi)i∈I










for the speciﬁcation (24), even though the decision maker is getting an higher
outcome kx0, possibly much higher since k can be arbitrarily large. The speciﬁcation (24)
only focuses on relative concerns and so it altogether neglects this improvement in the decision
maker’s own outcome.
















, we would still have the term u(xo) which may be such that u(kxo) > u(xo).
27For example, in their inﬂuential work Campbell and Cochrane (1999) adopt an intertemporal version of (24)







= γ (xo/x) for some strictly increasing function γ : R → R.
3210.3 An Ex Post Perspective







, the relative outcome eﬀects once uncertainty resolves and
a state s obtains. In other words, they will assess the relative performance of theirs acts fo with
respect to those, fi, of their peers from the standpoint of the realized state s.
This ex post perspective is essentially due to the separability across states implied by the
monotonicity Axiom 2, which is a special instance of the general monotonicity principle that
“an alternative is better when it is better in all possible contingencies.” The ex post perspective
that in our context this, widely adopted, principle entails may be regarded as featuring an ex
post, emotional, bias. For, decision makers who rank alternatives in F according to (1) may be
seen as partially overlooking what ex ante was actually available in F, both for them and for
their peers. In fact, in F there might well not be acts’ proﬁles that deliver in each state the ex
post most desired result for the decision makers.
We adopted in our analysis Axiom 2 because we believe that it is a behaviorally meaningful
axiom and that the consequent possible ex post emotional bias is a key component in how
decision makers emotionally react to peers’ outcomes. Notice that our decision makers ex ante
anticipate this possible ex post emotional bias, and their optimal choices will thus keep it into
account.
Thanks to the behavioral nature of our axioms – in particular, of Axiom 2 – the meaning-
fulness of our modelling choice will be ultimately determined by the experimental performance
of our axioms. In any case, the framework we introduced in this paper would be the natural








u(fo (s))dP (s) + %
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is a variation of the choice criterion (1) that does not feature the ex post bias. We expect that a
suitable modiﬁcation of our analysis, in particular of Axiom 2, would be able to deliver (26). A
main contribution of this paper is, in fact, to provide a framework where social decision theory
issues can be studied.
10.4 Private and Social Outcomes




of the acts have a social dimension and
thus enter both terms in the representation. It is possible, however, to expand the representation
in order to model choices that may feature both outcomes that have a social dimension and
outcomes that do not have it, possibly because of diﬀerent degrees of observability by peers. For
example, in the consumption and saving problem of Section 9 in which agents select optimal
consumption and eﬀort pairs, it is plausible to think that consumption is, in general, more easily
observed by peers than eﬀort.
Formally, in this case we need to consider outcome spaces that have a Cartesian structure,





∈ C × E × CI. Here the choices of our decision
maker o feature outcome pairs (xo,yo), where xo is the social outcome (e.g., consumption), while













33where the private outcome yo only enters in the ﬁrst term. A routine modiﬁcation of our
derivation, omitted for brevity, delivers the extended representation (27). In the economic
application of Section 9 we actually use the extended representation (27).
10.5 Intertemporal Version
A natural and important issue is the intertemporal extension of our static choice criterion (1).
Though a full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, here we study in some
detail the deterministic case. We then brieﬂy discuss the more general case with uncertainty.
Consider a deterministic problem with, for convenience, a ﬁnite horizon T ≥ 1. The natural
(and standard) way to study this problem is to interpret states as dates. That is, we consider a
ﬁnite set S = {0,1,2,...,T}, now viewed as a set of points in time rather than states of Nature.
In this case, for all f ∈ A and t ∈ S, f (t) represents consumption at date t.
The next assumption is a standard intertemporal separability condition.




fo (τ) if τ 6= t,t + 1
c if τ = t







fo (τ) if τ 6= t,t + 1
¯ c if τ = t




holds for some t < T, then it holds for every t < T.
This axiom, added to Axioms A.1-A.11 delivers a simple discounted extension of our model
in the deterministic case.
Theorem 8 Let S = {0,1,2,...,T} with T ≥ 1 and Σ = 2S. A binary relation % on F satisﬁes
Axioms A.1-A.11, and E.1 if and only if and only if there exist two non-constant aﬃne functions
u,v : C → R, a diago-null function % : pim(v (C)) → R increasing in the ﬁrst component and
decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second one, and a constant β > 0 such that v



























We close with few remarks on the extension of the criterion (28) to the general case with


























where Σt represents the information available to agent o at time t.
An axiomatic derivation of this stochastic criterion is left for future research. Here just notice
that the very special case in which T = 1, which we used in Section 9, can be easily obtained
from Theorem 2 by adding a ﬁctitious state s0 that corresponds to period 0.
29See page 69 in the appendix.
3410.6 Inequity Aversion
Like envy/pride, also inequity aversion is a social emotion that arises in reaction to peers’ out-
comes. It is based on fairness considerations and we refer the interested reader to Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) for a thorough presentation of this emotion. To further show the methodolog-
ical scope of our analysis, here we brieﬂy show how to model inequity aversion in our general
framework.
The starting point are the basic axioms A.1-A.6, along with the basic representation (3) they
deliver. The ﬁrst additional assumption we make is that agent o evaluates peers’ outcomes via
his own preference.
















It is easy to see that this axiom is satisﬁed by preferences that have the private utility
representation (5), that is, preferences that satisfy both the basic axioms and Axioms B.1-B.2.
The next axiom is, instead, peculiar to inequity aversion. As Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 822)
write, “... [players] experience inequity if they are worse oﬀ in material terms than the other
players in the experiment, and they also feel inequity if they are better oﬀ.” This motivates the
following behavioral assumption.














In other words, agent o dislikes any change in the outcome of a given peer j that in his
view increases inequity, either by improving an already better outcome (i.e., c % xj % xo) or by
impairing a worse one (i.e., xo  xj % c).
We can now state the inequity aversion representation result (recall that pid(K) was deﬁned
before Theorem 5).
Theorem 9 A binary relation % on F satisﬁes A.1-A.6 and F.1-F.2 if and only if there exist
a non-constant aﬃne function u : C → R, a diago-null function ξ : pid(u(C)) → R increasing
in the second component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the third one, and a























represents % on F and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
For example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that there is no uncertainty and that outcomes















max{xo − xi,0} (30)
35where βo ≤ αo and 0 ≤ βo < 1. This is a special case of (29), where u is the identity and the





































= (z,0,0), in which case ξ vanishes.
Clearly, ξ is diago-null, increasing in the second argument, and decreasing in the third
one (w.r.t. stochastic dominance). This speciﬁcation of can be obtained from the general
representation (29) along the lines of the special cases we discussed in Section 6.
The uniqueness properties of the representation of inequity averse preferences are similar to
the ones we obtained so far:
Proposition 13 Two triplets (u,ξ,P) and (ˆ u, ˆ ξ, ˆ P) represent the same relation % as in Theorem































The Fehr and Schmidt speciﬁcation (30) is an instance of a more general speciﬁcation of










γ (xo − xi), (31)

















γ (z − tl) +
X
i∈J
γ (z − rj)
!
.
The speciﬁcation (30) is, in turn, a special case of (31). In fact,
X
i∈I
max{xi − xo,0} =
X
i∈I:xi≥xo
(xi − xo) and
X
i∈I








∈ RIo. Then, (31) reduces to (30) by setting
γ (t) =
(
−βot if t ≥ 0,
αot if t < 0,
Summing up, we derived an inequity aversion representation that encompasses Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) by adding suitable behavioral assumptions to the basic axioms A.1-A.6. The
behavioral nature of our derivation allows to use behavioral data to test in a subject the relevance
of fairness/inequity considerations, as opposed to, say, envy/pride ones. In fact, it is enough to
check experimentally, through choice behavior, whether for example a subject tends to satisfy
Axiom B.1 rather than F.2.








∈ pid(u(C)), by deﬁnition we have tl < z for all l ∈ L and
rj ≥ z for all j ∈ J.
36Finally, observe that in the representation (30), F.2 is violated and Axiom B.1 is satisﬁed
when βo < 0 ≤ αo. In this case (30) becomes a simple and tractable example of the private
utility representation (5).31 This is a possibility mentioned by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who
on p. 824 of their paper observe “... we believe that there are subjects with βo < 0 ...” that is,
as Veblen (1899, p. 31) wrote long time ago, there are subjects for whom “... it is extremely
gratifying to possess something more than others.” These subjects experience envy/pride, and
so violate axiom F.2 and satisfy B.1.
10.7 Some Methodological Issues
In this subsection we discuss some methodological issues that arise in our analysis.
Social Theory The Veblen critique questions the basic tenet of standard consumer theory
that consumers’ preferences only depends on the private functions and uses of the consumer
goods, that is, on their physical nature, with no role for any possible cultural/symbolic, and so
social, aspect they might have. In this way, standard consumer theory can analyze consumers’
decisions in isolation, without worrying about any possible externality that such decisions might
generate.
In contemporary societies, however, the symbolic value of consumption has come to play
a fundamental role in social interactions, much more than ever before in human history. So-
cial scientists often describe contemporary societies as “consumer societies,” with consumerism
being their distinguishing feature. This is the result of improved living conditions (symbolic
consumption has a smaller role in mere subsistence economies), but also of major cultural and
technological changes.
For this reason, consumption and its symbolic aspects has been a central research theme in
the social sciences, beginning with the seminal works of Barthes (1964) and Baudrillard (1968),
(1970) and (1972) in Social Theory, of Sahlins (1976) and Douglas and Isherwood (1979) in
Anthropology, and of, in a more applied context, Levy (1959) and Grubb and Grathwohl (1967)
in Consumer Research.
At a theoretical level, the most inﬂuential works are probably those of Barthes and Bau-
drillard. Their studies move from Veblen’s early analysis of conspicuous consumption, which
they gave a theoretical framework by observing that the symbolic aspect of consumer goods
makes them a system of signs, a communication system, and, as such, suitable to semiotic anal-
ysis.32 In other words, their theoretical stance is that consumer theory should be viewed as part
of Semiotics, to be studied with the concepts and categories elaborated in that area since the
seminal works of Saussure. This means, inter alia, that consumer theory should be studied with
reference to linguistic laws, which in Barthes’ “translinguistic” view (see Eco 1976 p. 30) are
the reference model for the study of all systems of signs.
However controversial, the works of Barthes and Baudrillard provide an important theoretical
perspective on consumption, building on Veblen’s original insights. An early application of the
semantic approach to consumption is Baudrillard’s generalization of Marxian political economy,
with the introduction of the “sign value” as a supplement to the classic user and exchange values
in order to model the symbolic side of goods (Baudrillard 1972).
This semantic theoretical perspective on consumption gives prominence to the symbolic over
31This happens, more generally, in (31) when γ is an increasing function.
32Consumer goods (and, more generally, all objects) are sign-functions in the terminology of Barthes (1964)
because, unlike verbal signs, they have a functional origin (see Eco (1976) pp. 48-50).
37the functional,33 and thus emphasizes the social nature of consumption. In fact, the symbolic
is, by its nature, social because its meaningfulness relies on the existence of an interpretation
code, a “consumer culture,” shared by all consumers (Baudrillard 1970). In the large literatures
that the works of Barthes and Baudrillard originated,34 the prominence of the symbolic over the
functional became more and more accentuated, with consumption decisions viewed as essentially
determined by the symbolic meaning of the goods. In Social Theory, economic exchange is thus
reduced to a purely symbolic exchange.
We agree with the Veblenian and social theoretic insight that consumption decisions depend
on both the functional and symbolic meanings of the chosen goods. For this reason, these
decisions must be studied as social decisions and only a proper modelling of their social dimension
can make them meaningful and understandable. This was, in fact, our original motivation and,
in a sense, our “social” extension of standard consumer theory parallels that undertaken by
Baudrillard for Marxian political economy. We disagree, however, with social theorists in some
fundamental methodological and substantive issues.
On the methodological side, this is a paper in theoretical consumer theory: our purpose
is to extend, incrementally, standard consumer theory by modelling a social dimension so far
overlooked in economic theory.35 We try to do this in the most parsimonious way, by remaining
as close as possible to the standard model. We thus adopt the classic, Weberian, methodological
individualism and rational action approach of standard consumer theory, as well as its revealed
preference method. Our agents have preferences that, in principle, can be behaviorally elicited
and that are represented by objective functions that agents maximize. Unlike standard consumer
theory, where the objective function to maximize is a function u that models the intrinsic,
material, utility of consumption as determined by its uses, in our general representation (1)
the objective function depends both on a conventional function u and on a new function v
that models the social dimension of consumption.36 In Weber (1968)’s terminology, our agents’
intentional states have both a private and a social dimension.
The presence of the function u in our representation reﬂects another major, substantive,
diﬀerence of our approach relative to Social Theory. In fact, we believe that the functional
dimension of consumption still plays an important role in consumer behavior and we do not
agree with the social theoretic almost exclusive focus on the symbolic. As Lucretius wrote,
“utilitas expressit nomina rerum.”37
Instrumental Approach As we have discussed at length, our approach lies within the neo-
classical framework and generalizes the standard model by enlarging the scope of agents’ prefer-
ences. A diﬀerent route to study some social decision in a neoclassical setting has been pursued
by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite in a series of inﬂuential papers.38 In a matching model
with conventional agents who only care about their own private consumption (and that of their
33Whose role is often regarded as merely ancillary, as an ex post rationalization of a prime symbolic meaning.
As Barthes (1964) writes “... once a sign is constituted, society can very well refunctionalize it, and speak about
as it were an object made for use: a fur-coat will be described as it served only to protect from the cold.” (p. 42
in the English translation).
34For reviews, see, e.g., Mick (1986), McCracken (1988), Bocock (1993), and Slater (1997).
35Though our preference functional (1) is fully general, application to consumer theory is a main motivation.
36In Baudrillard’s generalized Marxian political economy, we can view u and v as modelling functional value
and symbolic value, respectively.
37“Need and use did mould the names of things,” De Rerum Natura, translation of W. E. Leoanard. We owe
this quotation to Rossi-Landi (1968).
38See their (1992), (1995), (1998), and (2006) articles, as well as the methodological piece by Postlewaite (1998).
38oﬀspring), they elegantly show how status/rank concerns may arise for purely instrumental rea-
sons: an higher status allows better consumption opportunities, which in turn enhance agents’
welfare. As Postlewaite (1998) p. 785 said, “individuals have a concern for relative standing
because relative standing is instrumental in determining ultimate consumption levels.”
The instrumental approach is very appealing and insightful, as Postlewaite (1998) eloquently
discusses. There are, however, a few reasons why here we pursue a diﬀerent approach.
First (and foremost), we believe that envy and pride are fundamental emotions, which shape
our attitudes toward competition and dominance, our fundamental social attitudes. Envy and
pride are key traits in human behavior, possibly hard-wired over time through evolution (see
Robson 2001). Who we are, our “personality,” is substantially shaped by these two basic emo-
tions, no less than by the traditional, “utilitarian,” emotions of pleasure and pain that agents
derive from private, material, consumption and that underlie standard utility functions.39
We thus take as primitive the social emotions of envy and pride, on equal footing with the
traditional “private” emotions of pleasure and pain. In other words, we do not regard these
private emotions as more fundamental for economic modelling. The reason why we believe
that it is time to enrich the emotional scope of utility analysis is that in our contemporary
societies social emotions play a bigger and bigger role, partly because of major cultural and
technological changes, as we argued earlier in this section. This is a basic insight of Social
Theory, which we fully agree with. Neglecting these social emotions has been for a long time
a reasonable simplifying assumption, certainly at the time when neoclassical utility theory was
born. Veblen’s analysis was much ahead of his time also because, back then, it was arguably
less relevant empirically.40 But, this is no longer true now, as empirical research is currently
showing.41 To conclude, one should never forget that, like all social sciences, Economics is an
historically determined discipline and even its more fundamental assumptions might need an
update.
Even if one disagrees with our basic view, there is a diﬀerent, more pragmatic, reason why
it is useful to model social decisions by enlarging preferences’ domain. In fact, the objective
functions that we derive can be viewed as a reduced form of a more complex, possibly not so
easily modelled, setting where social considerations may be properly viewed as instrumental. The
large number of empirical papers that incorporate social traits into agents’ objective functions
is a clear proof of the pragmatic usefulness of our modelling strategy. From this standpoint, the
main contribution of our axiomatic analysis is to provide some theoretical discipline and insight
on these otherwise ad hoc manipulations of agents’ objective functions. As we mentioned before,
despite the large empirical literature, very little theoretical work exists on this subject.
Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc The instrumental view ultimately requires to go beyond emo-
tions, which are just “ﬁctional causes” of behavior, mere post hoc, ergo propter hoc explanations,
as Skinner remarked in his classic (1953) and (1974) books. The deep causes of behavior have
a substantial biological basis, determined over time by evolution.42 In this vein, several papers
39As well known, Pareto showed that the hedonic interpretation of utility functions is not a theoretical necessity.
It is, however, a perfectly legitimate interpretation (see the discussion below on revealed preference) that is still
pervasive in Economics, as the widespread reference to marginal utilities shows.
40Except, of course, for Veblen’s social milieu, which motivated his theory. See Matt (2003) for a description
of American consumer society at the time of Veblen.
41See in particular the cited works of Dynan, Luttmer, and Ravina, which ﬁnd evidence of relative consumption
concerns, our primary motivation.
42See, for example, Gross (2006) for a critique of this “organic” view.
39have investigated possible biological/evolutionary explanations of preference patterns.43 For ex-
ample, a suitable evolutionary analysis would be in order to model the causes of the envious
behavior discussed in Section 1.1.1, that is, learning, dominance, and competition.
The objective of Decision Theory, however, is to model how people choose and how this mod-
elling can be usefully embedded in more general economic models. Emotions can be considered
as a ﬁrst approximation explanation of behavior, suﬃcient for the Decision Theory purposes,
in an utilitarian tradition that traces its origin back at least to Bentham’s classic pleasure and
pain calculus.
In this regard, observe that there is no conceptual inconsistency, both in standard theory and
in its extended version presented here, between adherence to the revealed preference methodology
and an emotional/hedonistic interpretation of preference rankings and of the derived objective
functions. This was recognized since the very beginning of revealed preference analysis, which
“does not preclude the introduction of utility by any who may care to do so, nor will it contradict
the results attained by use of related constructs,” as Samuelson (1938) p. 62 observed.
Revealed preference analysis is the fundamental Decision Theory methodology that bases,
through axiomatic analysis, the derivation of decision makers’ objective functions on actual
choice behavior. This gives empirical content to utility analysis since, still today, choice behavior
is the best observable, and so testable, aspect of human economic behavior.44
Whenever possible, it is thus very important to anchor, through axiomatic analysis, objective
functions to choice behavior.45 That said, one can always interpret observed choices as the result
of a Benthamian emotional calculus, be either the traditional private pain/pleasure calculus or
the more general private and social one advocated here. Interpretation is a semantic exercise
and, as such, is legitimate insofar as it provides a reasonable interpretation of the formal model
(i.e., of the axioms), whose scientiﬁc status, however, is determined by its testable/falsiﬁable
choice foundations.
43See the surveys of Robson (2001) and Rayo and Becker (2007a), as well as the results in social cognitive
neuroscience overviewed in Frith and Frith (1999), Blakemore, Winston, and Frith (2004), Gallese, Keysersa, and
Rizzolatti (2004), Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, and Grafman (2005), and Lieberman (2007).
44Some recent technical advances, especially in the neurosciences (e.g., neuro scans), might suggest a future
where other sources of data will acquire a status comparable to that of choice behavior. In this case, revealed
preference analysis will have to expand its scope accordingly.
45As Schumpeter (1954) p. 1059 simply put it, “... nobody will deny that it is preferable to derive a given set
of propositions from externally or ‘objectively’ observable facts, if it can be done, than to derive the same set of
propositions from premisses established by introspection...”
4011 Proofs and Related Material
11.1 Distribution Functions
Let n,m ∈ N, I = {i1,...,in}, J = {j1,...,jm}, a = (ai1,ai2,...,ain) ∈ RI, and b = (bj1,...,bjm) ∈
RJ. In this subsection, we regroup some useful results on stochastic dominance.
Lemma 5 If ai1 ≤ ai2 ≤ ... ≤ ain and bj1 ≤ bj2... ≤ bjm, then the following facts are equivalent:
(i) Fa (t) ≤ Fb (t) for all t ∈ R.
(ii) n ≤ m and Fa (t) ≤ F(bj1,...,bjn) (t) for all t ∈ R.
(iii) n ≤ m and aik ≥ bjk for all k = 1,...,n.
Lemma 6 If ai1 ≤ ai2 ≤ ... ≤ ain and bj1 ≤ bj2... ≤ bjm, then the following facts are equivalent:
(i) Ga (t) ≥ Gb (t) for all t ∈ R.
(ii) n ≥ m and G(ain−m+1,ain−m+2,...,ain) (t) ≥ Gb (t) for all t ∈ R.
(iii) n ≥ m and ain−m+k ≥ bjk for all k = 1,...,m.
Lemma 7 The following statements are equivalent:
(i) µa stochastically dominates µb.
(ii) n = m and if σ and τ are permutations of {1,...,n} such that aiσ(1) ≤ aiσ(2) ≤ ... ≤ aiσ(n)
and bjτ(1) ≤ bjτ(2) ≤ ... ≤ bjτ(n), then aiσ(k) ≥ bjτ(k) for all k = 1,...,n.
(iii) n = m and there exists a permutation ζ of {1,...,n} such that aiζ(k) ≥ bjk for all k = 1,...,n.
(iv) There exists a bijection π : I → J such that ai ≥ bπ(i) for all i ∈ I.
(v) |I| = |J| and Fa (t) ≤ Fb (t) for all t ∈ R.
(vi) |I| = |J| and Ga (t) ≥ Gb (t) for all t ∈ R.
Moreover, if I = J and ai ≥ bi for all i ∈ I, then for each z ∈ R:
• G(ai)i∈I:ai≥z (t) ≥ G(bj)j∈J:bj≥z (t) for all t ∈ R.
• F(ai)i∈I:ai<z (t) ≤ F(bj)j∈J:bj<z (t) for all t ∈ R.
In particular, if µa stochastically dominates µb, then µa (K) = µb (K) for all K ⊆ R
containing the supports of µa and µb (i.e., they have the same total mass). On the other hand
if µe = 0 (that is e = (ei)i∈∅), then Fe = 0 ≤ Fd and Gd ≥ 0 = Ge for all d, that is µe
lower dominates and is upper dominated by every measure µd. Therefore, if µd stochastically
dominates or is stochastically dominated by µe, it follows that µd = 0 (from 0 ≤ Fd ≤ Fe = 0
and 0 ≤ Gd ≤ Ge = 0, respectively). This allows to conclude that in any case stochastic
dominance between µa and µb implies that they have the same total mass.
4111.2 Chain Rules for Dini Derivatives
Let a,b ∈ R with a < b. If f,g : (a,b) → R, set
limsupx→a+ f (x) ≡ lim
δ→0+ sup
h∈(0,δ)




f (a + h),
liminf x→a+ f (x) ≡ lim
δ→0+ inf
h∈(0,δ)




f (a + h),
limsupx→b− f (x) ≡ lim
δ→0+ sup
h∈(0,δ)




f (b − h),
liminf x→b− f (x) ≡ lim
δ→0+ inf
h∈(0,δ)




f (b − h).
These limits always exist in [−∞,+∞],46 with the conventions:
(−∞)
·
+ (+∞) = (+∞)
·
+ (−∞) = +∞ = (−∞)
·





(+∞) = (+∞) +
·
(−∞) = −∞ = (−∞) −
·
(−∞) = (+∞) −
·
(+∞).
It is easy to see that limsupx→a+ f (x) = sup{limsupn→∞ f (xn) : (a,b) 3 xn → a+}, and
that there exists (a,b) 3 ¯ xn → a+ such that limn→∞ f (¯ xn) = limsupx→a+ f (x).47
Let f : [a,b] → R, and set
D+f (c) ≡ limsupx→c+
f (x) − f (c)
x − c
and D+f (c) ≡ liminf x→c+
f (x) − f (c)
x − c
for all c ∈ [a,b), and, analogously,
D−f (c) ≡ limsupx→c−
f (x) − f (c)
x − c
and D−f (c) ≡ liminf x→c−
f (x) − f (c)
x − c
for all c ∈ (a,b]. It is easy to see that, if c ∈ [a,b) is a local maximum, then
D+f (c) ≤ D+f (c) ≤ 0,
and, analogously, if c ∈ (a,b] is a local maximum, then
0 ≤ D−f (c) ≤ D−f (c).
Next we provide a chain rule that will be useful in the sequel:
Proposition 14 Let v : [α,β] → [a,b] be strictly increasing, onto, and concave. Then, given
any f : [a,b] → R, we have:
(i) D+ (f ◦ v)(γ) = v0
+ (γ)D+f (v (γ)) provided either γ ∈ (α,β) or γ = α and either v0
+ (α) 6=
+∞ or D+ (f)(v (α)) > 0.
(ii) D+ (f ◦ v)(γ) = v0
+ (γ)D+f (v (γ)) provided either γ ∈ (α,β) or γ = α and either v0
+ (α) 6=
+∞ or D+f (v (α)) > 0.
(iii) D− (f ◦ v)(γ) = v0
− (γ)D−f (v (γ)) provided either γ ∈ (α,β) or γ = β and v0
− (β) 6= 0.
(iv) D− (f ◦ v)(γ) = v0
− (γ)D−f (v (γ)) provided either γ ∈ (α,β) or γ = β and v0
− (β) 6= 0.
46To be precise, we should write d > δ > 0, where d ∈ (0,b − a), rather than δ > 0. But, no confusion should
arise.
47With analogous results for the other limits.
4211.3 Weakly Increasing Transformations of Expected Values
Let K be a nontrivial interval in the real line, I a non-empty ﬁnite set, and % be a binary
relation on the hypercube KI.
Axiom 1 % is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 Let x,y ∈ KI. If xi ≥ yi for all i in I, then x % y.
Axiom 3 For all x,y,z ∈ KI, the sets {α ∈ [0,1] : αx + (1 − α)z % y} and {α ∈ [0,1] : αx +
(1 − α)z - y} are closed.
Axiom 4 Let x,y ∈ KI. If αx + (1 − α)z  αy + (1 − α)z for some α in (0,1] and z in KI,
then βx + (1 − β)w % βy + (1 − β)w for all β in (0,1] and w in KI.
Axiom 5 Let x,y ∈ KI. If x % y, then αx + (1 − α)z % αy + (1 − α)z for all α in (0,1] and
z in KI.
Passing to the contrapositive shows that the classical independence Axiom 5 implies Axiom
4 (under completeness).
Denote by Π(I) the set of all permutations of I.
Axiom 6 x ∼ x ◦ π, for all x ∈ KI and each π ∈ Π(I).
Lemma 8 A binary relation % on KI satisﬁes Axioms 1-4 if and only if there exist a probability
measure m on I and a continuous and (weakly) increasing function ψ : K → R such that
x % y ⇔ ψ (m · x) ≥ ψ (m · y). (32)
In this case, % satisﬁes Axiom 6 if and only if (32) holds for the uniform m (i.e. mi ≡ 1/|I|
for all i ∈ I).
Proof of Lemma 8. If % is trivial take any m and any constant ψ (in particular, the uniform
m will do).
If % is not trivial, set
x %∗ y ⇔ αx + (1 − α)z % αy + (1 − α)z for all α ∈ (0,1] and z ∈ KI.
Notice that (taking α = 1) the above deﬁnition guarantees that x %∗ y implies x % y.
Next we show that %∗ is complete. In fact, x 6%∗ y implies αx + (1 − α)z ≺ αy + (1 − α)z
for some α ∈ (0,1] and z ∈ KI, but % satisﬁes Axiom 4, thus αx+(1 − α)z - αy+(1 − α)z for
all α ∈ (0,1] and z ∈ KI, that is y %∗ x. Moreover, %∗ is transitive. In fact, x %∗ y and y %∗ w
implies αx + (1 − α)z % αy + (1 − α)z and αy + (1 − α)z % αw + (1 − α)z for all α ∈ (0,1]
and z ∈ KI, then αx + (1 − α)z % αw + (1 − α)z for all α ∈ (0,1] and z ∈ KI, thus x %∗ w.
Then %∗ satisﬁes Axiom 1.
Next we show that %∗ satisﬁes Axiom 2. Let x,y ∈ KI. If xi ≥ yi for all i in I, then
αxi + (1 − α)zi ≥ αyi + (1 − α)zi for all i ∈ I, α ∈ (0,1], and z ∈ KI, but % satisﬁes Axiom 2,
thus αx + (1 − α)z % αy + (1 − α)z for all α ∈ (0,1] and z ∈ KI, that is x %∗ y.
Next we show that %∗ satisﬁes Axiom 3. Let x,y,w ∈ KI, {βk}k∈N ⊆ [0,1] be such that
βkx + (1 − βk)y %∗ w for all k ∈ N, and βk → β as k → ∞. Arbitrarily choose α ∈ (0,1] and
z ∈ KI, then
α(βkx + (1 − βk)y) + (1 − α)z % αw + (1 − α)z for all k ∈ N,
43but α(βkx + (1 − βk)y) + (1 − α)z = βk (αx + (1 − α)z) + (1 − βk)(αy + (1 − α)z), hence
βk (αx + (1 − α)z) + (1 − βk)(αy + (1 − α)z) % αw + (1 − α)z for all k ∈ N.
Since % satisﬁes Axiom 3, then we can pass to the limit as k → ∞ and ﬁnd β (αx + (1 − α)z)+
(1 − β)(αy + (1 − α)z) % αw + (1 − α)z, that is
α(βx + (1 − β)y) + (1 − α)z % αw + (1 − α)z.
Since this is true for all α ∈ (0,1] and z ∈ KI, it implies βx + (1 − β)y %∗ w. Therefore
{γ ∈ [0,1] : γx + (1 − γ)y %∗ w} is closed. Replacing %∗ with -∗ (and % with -), the same can
be proved for the set {γ ∈ [0,1] : γx + (1 − γ)y -∗ w}.
Next we show that %∗ satisﬁes Axiom 5. Let x %∗ y, α,β in (0,1], and w,z in KI.
α(βx + (1 − β)w) + (1 − α)z =
(
x if αβ = 1 (i.e. α = β = 1),












1−αβ z ∈ KI is a bona ﬁde convex combination. Thus,
if αβ 6= 1, since x %∗ y, we can conclude



















α(βx + (1 − β)w) + (1 − α)z % α(βy + (1 − β)w) + (1 − α)z. (33)
Clearly, (33) descends from x %∗ y also if αβ = 1. Therefore x %∗ y implies (33) for all α,β in
(0,1] and w,z in KI; a fortiori it implies βx+(1 − β)w %∗ βy+(1 − β)w for all β in (0,1] and
w in KI.
Finally, since x %∗ y implies x % y and both relations are complete, non-triviality of %
implies non-triviality of %∗.
By the Anscombe-Aumann Theorem there exists a (unique) probability measure m on I
such that x %∗ y if and only if m · x ≥ m · y; in particular,
m · x ≥ m · y ⇒ x % y. (34)
Consider the restriction of % to the set of all constant elements of KI and the usual iden-
tiﬁcation of this set with K.48 Such restriction is clearly complete, transitive, and monotonic.
Next we show that it is also topologically continuous. Let tn,t,r ∈ K be such that tn → t as
n → ∞ and tn % r (resp. tn - r) for all n ∈ N. Since tn is converging to t ∈ K, there exist
τ,T ∈ K (τ < T) such that tn,t ∈ [τ,T] for all n ∈ N. Let αn = (T − τ)
−1 (tn − τ) for all
n ∈ N. Clearly {αn}n∈N ⊆ [0,1], αn → (T − τ)
−1 (t − τ) = α as n → ∞, tn = αnT + (1 − αn)τ
and t = αT + (1 − α)τ. Axiom 3 and αnT + (1 − αn)τ = tn % r (resp. tn - r) imply
t = αT + (1 − α)τ % r (resp. t - r).
Therefore, there exists a continuous and increasing function ψ : K → R such that ~ t % ~ r if
and only if ψ (t) ≥ ψ (r). Let m be any probability measure that satisﬁes (34), then x ∼ − − − → m · x
for every x ∈ KI, and x % y if and only if − − − → m · x % − − − → m · y if and only if ψ (m · x) ≥ ψ (m · y). This
proves that Axioms 1-4 are suﬃcient for representation (32). The converse is trivial.
48With the usual convention of denoting by t both the real number t ∈ K and the constant element ~ t of K
I
taking value t for all i ∈ I.
44Assume that ψ and m represent % in the sense of (32). Notice that the set O of all probabili-
ties p such that ψ and p represent % in the sense of (32) coincides with the set of all probabilities
q is such that q·x ≥ q·y implies x % y.49 Let p,q ∈ O and α in [0,1], then (αp + (1 − α)q)·x ≥
(αp + (1 − α)q) · y implies α(p · x) + (1 − α)(q · x) ≥ α(p · y) + (1 − α)(q · y), hence either
p · x ≥ p · y or q · x ≥ q · y, in any case x % y. Therefore O is convex.
Assume % satisﬁes Axiom 6, and let m ∈ O. For each π ∈ Π(I) and each x in KI, x ∼ x ◦




i∈I mπ−1(i)xπ(π−1(i)) =  
m ◦ π−1





for all x ∈ KI and each π ∈ Π(I). Then,
for each σ ∈ Π(I), x % y if and only if ψ ((m ◦ σ) · x) ≥ ψ ((m ◦ σ) · y), that is m ◦ σ ∈ O. But
O is convex, thus the uniform probability (1/|I|)~ 1 =
P
σ∈Π(I) (1/|I|!)m ◦ σ belongs to O. The
converse is trivial. 
11.4 Representation Results
Proof of Lemma 2. Nontriviality, independence, and the Archimedean property of ˙ % are
immediate consequences of Axioms A.8-A.10. As to transitivity, we have c ˙ %d and d ˙ %e if and
only if (xo,(xi)i∈I,d{j}) % (xo,(xi)i∈I,c{j}) and (xo,(xi)i∈I,e{j}) % (xo,(xi)i∈I,d{j}) for each
(xo,(xi)i∈I) in X, and j / ∈ I. By transitivity of %, then (xo,(xi)i∈I,e{j}) % (xo,(xi)i∈I,c{j}),
that is, c ˙ %e.
The preference ˙ % is complete. If not c ˙ %d, then if there is a (xo,(xi)i∈I) ∈ X and j / ∈ I such
that (xo,(xi)i∈I,d{j})  (xo,(xi)i∈I,c{j}). By axiom A.7, there is no (xo,(xi)i∈I) ∈ X and j / ∈ I
such that (xo,(xi)i∈I,c{j})  (xo,(xi)i∈I,d{j}). That is, d ˙ %c. 
Lemma 9 A binary relation % on F satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.5 if and only if there exist a non-
constant aﬃne function u : C → R, a function r : X → R, with r(cIo) = 0 for all c ∈ C and












represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
Moreover,

ˆ u, ˆ r, ˆ P

is another representation of % in the above sense if and only if ˆ P = P
and there exist α,β ∈ R with α > 0 such that ˆ u = αu + β and ˆ r = αr.
Proof. The von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem guarantees that there exists an aﬃne function
u : C → R such that
(c) % (¯ c) ⇔ u(c) ≥ u(¯ c)
provided c,¯ c ∈ C.




Proof. First observe that for all c ∈ C and all I ∈ ℘(N), iterated application of Axiom A.5 and
transitivity deliver cIo ∼ (c). Hence by Axiom A.3 there exist c
¯












49If p ∈ O, then p · x ≥ p · y implies ψ (p · x) ≥ ψ (p · y), because ψ is increasing, and then x % y. Conversely,




≥ ψ (m ·~ r) if and only if ψ (t) ≥ ψ (r)).
If q is such that q · x ≥ q · y implies x % y, then x ∼ − − → q · x for every x ∈ K
I, and x % y if and only if − − → q · x % − − → q · y if
and only if ψ (q · x) ≥ ψ (q · y); that is q ∈ O.
45If one of the two relations is an equivalence the proof is ﬁnished. Otherwise, the above relations
are strict, and, by Axiom A.2, there exist α,β ∈ (0,1) such that
(1 − α)c
¯




≺ (1 − β)c
¯
+ β¯ c.
and it must be α < β (u is aﬃne on C and it represents % on C). By Axiom A.3 again, there
exist λ,µ ∈ (0,1) such that
(1 − λ)((1 − α)c
¯
+ α¯ c) + λ((1 − β)c
¯








≺ (1 − µ)((1 − α)c
¯
+ α¯ c) + µ((1 − β)c
¯
+ β¯ c)
In particular, there exist α∗ = (1 − λ)α + λβ, α∗ > α, and β∗ = (1 − µ)α + µβ, β∗ < β, such
that, denoting (1 − α)c
¯
+α¯ c by c
¯
α¯ c, we have
c
¯
α¯ c ≺ c
¯
α∗¯ c ≺ f ≺ c
¯
β∗¯ c ≺ c
¯
β¯ c
and α < α∗ < β∗ < β. (Call this argument: “shrinking”.)
Set γ ≡ sup{δ ∈ [0,1] : c
¯




δ¯ c, and thus γ ≤ β∗ < β.
Obviously γ ≥ α∗ > α.
Suppose f ≺c
¯
γ¯ c, then c
¯
α¯ c ≺ f ≺c
¯





γ¯ c. Therefore sup{δ ∈ [0,1] : c
¯
δ¯ c ≺ f} ≤ γ∗ < γ, which is absurd.
Suppose c
¯
γ¯ c ≺ f, then c
¯
γ¯ c ≺ f ≺c
¯





γ∗¯ c ≺ f. Therefore sup{δ ∈ [0,1] : xδy ≺ f} ≥ γ∗ > γ, which is absurd.
Conclude that f ∼ c
¯
γ¯ c ∈ C. 




∈ F there exists af ∈ A such that f (s) ∼ af (s) for all
s ∈ S.




∈ F, denote by

Ak	n
k=1 a ﬁnite partition of S in Σ that





fo (¯ s),(fi (¯ s))i∈I

; take cf,k ∈ C such that
 
cf,k
∼ f (s) = f (¯ s). Deﬁne af (s) = cf,k if s ∈ Ak




∼ f (s) (36)
for all s ∈ S.50 




By Axiom A.1, there exist f,g ∈ F such that f  g. It follows from Claim 9.2 that  
af
 (ag). Thus, the restriction of % to A (or more precisely to the subset of F consisting of
elements of the form f = (a) for some a ∈ A = Ao) satisﬁes the assumptions of the Anscombe-
Aumann Theorem. Then there exist a probability P on Σ and a non-constant aﬃne function
u : C → R such that







provided a,b ∈ A.51
For all x ∈ X set U (x) ≡ u(cx) provided cx ∈ C and x ∼ (cx), clearly, U is well deﬁned (on










∼ f (s) provided s ∈ A
k .
51Notice that u represents % on C, hence w.l.o.g. this u is the same u we considered at the very beginning of
this proof.




∼ f (s) and (ag (s)) ∼ g (s) for

















































































∈ X. Then r(cIo) = U (cIo)−u(c) = 0


















∈ F. Which delivers representation (35). Moreover, for all c ∈ C, u(c) =






∈ u(C); i.e. V (F) = u(C).
Conversely, assume that there exist a non-constant aﬃne function u : C → R, a function
r : X → R with r(cIo) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘(N), and a probability P on Σ, such that














(ii) r(c) = 0 for all c ∈ C,
(iii) V (a) =
R
S u(a(s))dP (s) for all a ∈ A,
(iv) V (cIo) = u(c) for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘(N).
Proving necessity of the axioms for the representation is a standard exercise. We report it
just for the sake of completeness. Completeness and transitivity of % are obvious, non-triviality
descends from (iv) above and the fact that u is not constant: Axiom A.1 holds. Let f,g ∈ F be
such that f (s) % g (s) for all s ∈ S, then by (i)








for all s ∈ S, thus
Z
S
[u(fo (s)) + r(f (s))]dP (s) ≥
Z
S
[u(go (s)) + r(g (s))]dP (s)
which together with representation (35) delivers f % g: Axiom A.2 holds. Axiom A.3 holds
because of (iv), V (F) = u(C), and aﬃnity of u. Axiom A.4 holds because of (iii). Finally, for




and Axiom A.5 holds.
52Notice that r ◦f : S → R is a simple and measurable function for all f ∈ F, hence the integral in (35) is well
deﬁned.
47Let ˆ u : C → R a non-constant aﬃne function, ˆ r : X → R a function with ˆ r(cIo) = 0 for all
I ∈ ℘(N) and c ∈ C, and ˆ P be a probability on Σ, such that the functional ˆ V : F → R, deﬁned
by








dP (s) ∀f ∈ F
represents % and satisﬁes ˆ V (F) = ˆ u(C). The above point (iii) implies that
ˆ V (a) =
Z
S
ˆ u(a(s))d ˆ P (s) ∀a ∈ A
is an Anscombe-Aumann representation of % on A. Therefore ˆ P = P, and there exist α,β ∈ R
with α > 0 such that ˆ u = αu + β. For all x ∈ X, take c ∈ C such that ˆ V (x) = ˆ u(c), then, by
(iv), x ∼ (c) and, by (iv) again, V (x) = u(c). Points (i) and (iv) imply
ˆ r(x) = ˆ V (x) − ˆ u(xo) = ˆ u(c) − ˆ u(xo) = αu(c) + β − αu(xo) − β
= α(u(c) − u(xo)) = α(V (x) − u(xo)) = αr(x)
that is, ˆ r = αr. Conversely, if there exist α,β ∈ R with α > 0 such that ˆ u = αu + β, ˆ r = αr,
and ˆ P = P, then ˆ u : C → R is a non-constant aﬃne function, ˆ r : X → R is a function with
ˆ r(cIo) = 0 for all I ∈ ℘(N) and c ∈ C, ˆ P is a probability on Σ, and
ˆ V (f) =
Z
S




[αu(fo (s)) + β + αr(f (s))]dP (s) = αV (f) + β
obviously represents % on F; ﬁnally ˆ V (F) = αV (F) + β = αu(C) + β = ˆ u(C). 
Lemma 10 Let % be a binary relation on F that satisfy Axiom A.1. The following conditions
are equivalent:









∈ X and there is a bijection π : J → I such that yj % xπ(j)

















in X are such that there is
















. Else, we can assume





















in X are such that there is a bijection π : J → I







. Moreover, π−1 : I → J is such that xi = xπ(π−1(i)) = yπ−1(i) for all i ∈ I,











































Axiom B.1 holds. 
Proof of Lemma 1. First observe that for all I,J ∈ ℘(N), (xi)i∈I ∈ CI, (yj)j∈J ∈ CJ the
following facts are equivalent:
• There is a bijection π : J → I such that yj = xπ(j).
• µ(xi)i∈I = µ(yj)j∈J.
By Lemma 9, there exist a non-constant aﬃne function u : C → R, a function r : X → R
with r(cIo) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘(N), and a probability P on Σ, such that the functional























∈ X and µ(xi)i∈I = µ(yj)j∈J, then there is a bijection π : J → I

























. Therefore, for (xo,µ) ∈ C ×M(C)









∈ X and µ = µ(xi)i∈I.
Finally, let c ∈ C and 0 ≤ n ≤ |N|. Choose I ∈ ℘(N) with |I| = n, then %(c,nδc) =
r(cIo) = 0. That is, % is diago-null. This concludes the proof of the suﬃciency part.






















and there is a bijection π : J → I such that yj = xπ(j) for all j ∈ J, then µ(xi)i∈I = µ(yj)j∈J, and

















Therefore Axiom A.6 holds too.
The uniqueness part immediately descends from Lemma 9 . 
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 9, there exist a non-constant aﬃne function u : C → R, a
function r : X → R with r(cIo) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘(N), and a probability P on Σ, such














∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).

















. Therefore, for (xo,µ) ∈ C × M(u(C)) it is









∈ X and µ = µ(u(xi))i∈I. The obtained function θ is decreasing in the
second component with respect to stochastic dominance.
If µ(u(xi))i∈I stochastically dominates µ(u(yj))j∈J, then Lemma 7 guarantees that there exists




for all i ∈ I, therefore xi % yπ(i) for all


























Next we show that if (xo,µ),(yo,µ) ∈ C × M(u(C)) and u(xo) ≥ u(yo), then θ(xo,µ) ≥
θ(yo,µ). Therefore, for (z,µ) ∈ pim(u(C)) it is well posed to deﬁne
%(z,µ) = θ(xo,µ)
provided z = u(xo) and % is increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing in the second
component with respect to stochastic dominance.
Let (xo,µ),(yo,µ) ∈ C × M(u(C)) with u(xo) ≥ u(yo), and choose (xi)i∈I such that



















































































































that is θ(xo,µ) ≥ θ(yo,µ), as wanted.
Finally, let z ∈ u(C) and 0 ≤ n ≤ |N|. Choose c ∈ C such that u(c) = z and I ∈ ℘(N)















= r(cIo) = 0.








































in X be such that there exists a bijection π : J → I




for all j ∈ J, and by Lemma
7,
P
j∈J δu(yj) stochastically dominates
P















































































































. That is, Axiom B.2
holds. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let

ˆ u, ˆ %, ˆ P






















∈ X. By Lemma 9, there exist α,β ∈ R with α > 0 such that ˆ u = αu + β,
































































since ˆ u = αu + β amounts to u = α−1 (ˆ u − β).





















∈ pim(ˆ u(C)), then ˆ u : C → R is
non-constant aﬃne, it is easy to check that ˆ % : pim(ˆ u(C)) → R is well deﬁned, diago-null,
increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second, ˆ P
is a probability on Σ, and
















αu(fo (s)) + β + α%
 









= αV (f) + β
obviously represents % on F; ﬁnally ˆ V (F) = αV (F) + β = αu(C) + β = ˆ u(C). 
Lemma 11 Let % be a binary relation on F that satisfy Axioms A.1-A.5 and A.7-A.10. The
following conditions are equivalent:









∈ X and there is a bijection π : J → I such that yj ˙ % xπ(j)

















in X be such that there is a
















. Else we can assume




















in X are such that there is a bijection π : J → I







. Moreover, π−1 : I → J is such that xi = xπ(π−1(i)) = yπ−1(i) for all i ∈ I,
















and Axiom A.6 holds. 
Lemma 11 plays for the proof of Theorem 2 the role that Lemma 10 plays for the proof of
Theorem 1, as we see in the next proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 9, there exist a non-constant aﬃne function u : C → R, a
function r : X → R with r(cIo) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘(N), and a probability P on Σ, such














∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C). Moreover, by Axioms
A.1 and A.7-A.10 there exists v : C → R that represents ˙ %.

















. Therefore, for (xo,µ) ∈ C × M(v (C)) it is









∈ X and µ = µ(v(xi))i∈I. The obtained function θ is decreasing in the
second component with respect to stochastic dominance.
If µ(v(xi))i∈I stochastically dominates µ(v(yj))j∈J, then Lemma 7 guarantees that there exists




for all i ∈ I, therefore xi ˙ % yπ(i) for all


























52Next we show that if (xo,µ),(yo,µ) ∈ C × M(v (C)) and v (xo) ≥ v (yo), then θ(xo,µ) ≥
θ(yo,µ). Therefore, for (z,µ) ∈ pim(v (C)) it is well posed to deﬁne
%(z,µ) = θ(xo,µ)
provided z = v (xo) and % is increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing in the second
component with respect to stochastic dominance.
Let (xo,µ),(yo,µ) ∈ C × M(v (C)) with v (xo) ≥ v (yo), and choose (xi)i∈I such that


















































































































that is θ(xo,µ) ≥ θ(yo,µ), as wanted.
Finally, let z ∈ v (C) and 0 ≤ n ≤ |N|. Choose c ∈ C such that v (c) = z and I ∈ ℘(N) with















= r(cIo) = 0.































to obtain that % satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.5 (Lemma 9). Moreover, since v is non-constant aﬃne









in X be such that there exists a bijection π : J → I






















































































































. That is, Axiom A.11
holds. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let

ˆ u, ˆ v, ˆ %, ˆ P

be another representation of % and ˙ % in the sense of




















∈ X. By Lemma 9, there exist α,β ∈ R with α > 0 such that ˆ u = αu + β,
ˆ r = αr, and ˆ P = P. Moreover, since ˆ v represents ˙ %, there are ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with ˙ α > 0 such



























ˆ v (xo),µ(ˆ v(xi))i∈I

, and from































δ zi− ˙ β
˙ α
!
since ˆ v = ˙ αv + ˙ β amounts to v = ˙ α−1

ˆ v − ˙ β

.
Conversely, if ˆ P = P, and there exist α,β, ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with α, ˙ α > 0 such that ˆ u = αu + β,























pim(ˆ v (C)), then ˆ u, ˆ v : C → R are non-constant aﬃne, it is easy to check that ˆ % : pim(ˆ v (C)) →
R is well deﬁned, diago-null, increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic
dominance) in the second, ˆ P is a probability on Σ, ˆ v represents ˙ %, and




ˆ u(fo (s)) + ˆ %
 










αu(fo (s)) + β + α%
 









= αV (f) + β
obviously represents % on F; ﬁnally ˆ V (F) = αV (F) + β = αu(C) + β = ˆ u(C). 
Proof of Proposition 3. (iii)⇒(i) and (ii). If % coincides with ˙ % on C, then A.7-A.10 are
satisﬁed (Lemma 9 guarantees that %, hence ˙ %, is represented on C by an aﬃne non-constant
function u : C → R).













∈ X and j / ∈ I. Then Axiom B.1 is satisﬁed.














That is, Axiom B.3 holds.
(ii)⇒(iii). By Axiom B.3, c % c0 implies that c ˙ % c0, for all c,c0 ∈ C. Moreover, c  c0
implies c ˙  c0, for all c,c0 ∈ C; that is, c ˙ - c0 implies c - c0.
54(i)⇒(iii). By Axiom B.1, c % c0 implies that c ˙ % c0, for all c,c0 ∈ C. Moreover, Lemma 9
guarantees that % is represented by an aﬃne non-constant function u : C → R, Axioms A.1
and A.7-A.10 guarantee that ˙ % is represented by an aﬃne non-constant function v : C → R, it
follows that there are α,β ∈ R with α > 0 such that v = αu + β, that is % coincides with ˙ % on
C. 
Proof of Theorem 3. By Theorem 2 there exist two non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R,
a diago-null function % : pim(v (C)) → R increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing (w.r.t.
stochastic dominance) in the second, and a probability P on Σ, such that v represents ˙ % and





















∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
Fix z ∈ v (C) and I ∈ ℘(N)\∅. Consider the relation on v (C)
I deﬁned by (zi)i∈I %z,I (wi)i∈I








∈ X such that v (xo) = z, v (xi) = zi,





















∈ X such that v (x0
o) = z, v (x0





















































































, thus %z,I is
complete, transitive, monotonic, symmetric (that is it satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2, 6).
Fix z = v (xo) ∈ v (C) and I ∈ ℘(N)\∅. Let (zi)i∈I ,(¯ zi)i∈I ∈ v (C)
I. If there exist ¯ α ∈ (0,1]
and ¯ w ∈ v (C)
I such that
(¯ αzi + (1 − ¯ α) ¯ wi)i∈I z,I (¯ α¯ zi + (1 − ¯ α) ¯ wi)i∈I
take (xi)i∈I ,(¯ xi)i∈I ,(¯ yi)i∈I ∈ CI such that v (xi) = zi, v (¯ xi) = ¯ zi, and v (¯ yi) = ¯ wi, then
 




xo,(α¯ xi + (1 − ¯ α) ¯ yi)i∈I

by Axiom A.13, for all (yi)i∈I ∈ CI and α ∈ (0,1],
 




xo,(α¯ xi + (1 − α)yi)i∈I

that is (v (αxi + (1 − α)yi))i∈I %z,I (v (α¯ xi + (1 − α)yi))i∈I and
(αzi + (1 − α)v (yi))i∈I %z,I (α¯ zi + (1 − α)v (yi))i∈I
thus %z,I satisﬁes Axiom 4, since v (C)
I =

(v (yi))i∈I : (yi)i∈I ∈ CI	
.
55Fix z = v (xo) ∈ v (C) and I ∈ ℘(N)\∅. For all (zi)i∈I ,(¯ zi)i∈I ,(wi)i∈I ∈ v (C)
I, take
(xi)i∈I ,(¯ xi)i∈I ,(yi)i∈I ∈ C such that v (xj) = zj, v (¯ xj) = ¯ zj, and v (yj) = wj for all j ∈ I, and
notice that the sets





α ∈ [0,1] :
 












α ∈ [0,1] :
 






are closed because of Axiom A.14; thus %z,I satisﬁes Axiom 3. By Lemma 8, there exists a
(weakly) increasing and continuous function ψz,I : v (C) → R such that

















Next we show that if (z,µ),(z,µ0) ∈ pim(v (C))\{(z,0)} and E(µ) = E(µ0),53 then %(z,µ) =
%(z,µ0).
• If µ(v (C)) = µ0 (v (C)) = n (which must be positive), let I be an arbitrarily chosen subset
of I with cardinality n. Then there exist (zi)i∈I ,(wi)i∈I ∈ v (C)
I such that µ = µ(zi)i∈I









, i.e., %(z,µ) = %(z,µ0).








with |I| = n and |J| = m such that z = v (xo), µ = µ(v(xi))i∈I and µ0 = µ(v(yj))j∈J. Let




and by Axiom A.12,

















































































































(where L is the set deﬁne above) and
53Here E(µ) = µ(R)
−1 P
r∈supp(µ) rµ(r), that is |I|
−1 P









































⇔ (v (¯ xl))l∈L ∼v(xo),L (v (¯ yl))l∈L














for all (z,µ) ∈ pim(v (C))\{(z,0)}. With the conventions E(0) = |∅|
−1 P
i∈∅ zi = ∞ and
δ∞ = 0, we also have





The function η (z,t) = %(z,δt) for all (z,t) ∈ v (C) × (v (C) ∪ {∞}) is diago-null, increasing
in the ﬁrst component and decreasing in the second on v (C), and %(z,µ) = η (z,E(µ)) for all
(z,µ) ∈ pim(v (C)).
It only remains to show that η is continuously decreasing in the second component on v (C).
Fix z ∈ v (C), i ∈ N and notice that for all t,¯ t ∈ v (C) = v (C)
{i}
η (z,t) ≥ η (z,¯ t) ⇔ %(z,δt) ≥ %(z,δ¯ t) ⇔ t -z,{i} ¯ t ⇔ ψz,{i} (t) ≤ ψz,{i} (¯ t).





for all t ∈ v (C). The proof of suﬃciency is concluded by renaming η into %.
To prove necessity, assume there exist two non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R,
a diago-null function η : v (C) × (v (C) ∪ {∞}) → R increasing in the ﬁrst component and
continuously decreasing in the second on v (C), and a probability P on Σ, such that v represents























∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C). Set %(z,µ) = η (z,E(µ)) for
all (z,µ) ∈ pim(v (C)) (with the above convention E(0) = ∞). It is clear that % is diago-null,
increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second,
and hence, by Theorem 2, % on F satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.11. It remains to show that % satisﬁes
Axioms A.12, A.13, and A.14.






































∈ X and assume that
 




xo,(¯ αyi + (1 − ¯ α) ¯ zi)i∈I













v (¯ αxi + (1 − ¯ α) ¯ zi)
!


































































































































v (αxi + (1 − α)zi)
!







v (αyi + (1 − α)zi)
!
 



















∈ X and assume {αn}n∈N ⊆ [0,1], αn →
α, and
 






for all n ∈ N. Clearly, if I is empty,  















Else, let ψv(xo) : v (C) → R be a weakly decreasing and continuous function such that for all
t,¯ t ∈ v (C),
η (v (xo),t) ≥ η (v (xo),¯ t) ⇔ ψv(xo) (t) ≥ ψv(xo) (¯ t)
(which exists since η (v (xo),·) is continuously decreasing on v (C)). Then, for all n ∈ N,
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αnv (xi) + (1 − αn)v (zi)
!
54This cannot be the case if I is empty.




























α ∈ [0,1] :
 






is closed, and analogous
considerations hold for

α ∈ [0,1] :
 







Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that

ˆ u, ˆ v, ˆ %, ˆ P


























∈ X, by Lemma 9 it follows that ˆ P = P, and there exist α,β ∈ R with α > 0
such that ˆ u = αu+β, and ˆ r = αr; moreover since ˆ v represents ˙ %, there are ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with ˙ α > 0
such that ˆ v = ˙ αv + ˙ β. Let (z,t) ∈ ˆ v (C)
2, i ∈ N, and xo,xi ∈ C such that z = ˆ v (xo), t = ˆ v (xi),
then v (xo) =

z − ˙ β

/ ˙ α, v (xi) =

t − ˙ β

/ ˙ α. Hence
ˆ %(z,t) = ˆ r(xo,xi) = αr(xo,xi) = α%(v (xo),v (xi)) = α%
 
z − ˙ β
˙ α
,
t − ˙ β
˙ α
!
and clearly ˆ %(z,∞) = 0 = α%
 
z − ˙ β
˙ α
,
∞ − ˙ β
˙ α
!
for all z ∈ ˆ v (C).
The converse is trivial. In fact, if ˆ P = P, and there exist α,β, ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with α, ˙ α > 0
such that ˆ u = αu + β, ˆ v = ˙ αv + ˙ β, and ˆ %(z,r) = α%
 
z − ˙ β
˙ α
,
r − ˙ β
˙ α
!
for all (z,r) ∈ ˆ v (C) ×
(ˆ v (C) ∪ {∞}), then ˆ u, ˆ v : C → R are non-constant aﬃne, it is easy to check that ˆ % : ˆ v (C) ×
(ˆ v (C) ∪ {∞}) → R is well deﬁned, diago-null, increasing in the ﬁrst component and continuously
decreasing in the second on ˆ v (C), ˆ P is a probability on Σ, ˆ v represents ˙ %, and




ˆ u(fo (s)) + ˆ %
 
ˆ v (fo (s)),|I|
−1 X
i∈I
ˆ v (fi (s))
!#





αu(fo (s)) + β + α%
 




















dP (s) + β
= αV (f) + β
obviously represents % on F; ﬁnally ˆ V (F) = αV (F) + β = αu(C) + β = ˆ u(C). 
Proof of Theorem 4. By Theorem 2 there exist two non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R,
a diago-null function % : pim(v (C)) → R increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing (w.r.t.
stochastic dominance) in the second, and a probability P on Σ, such that v represents ˙ % and





















∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
59Claim 1. Let (z,µ) and (z,µ0) in pim(v (C)) be such that min(suppµ) ≤ min(suppµ0), max(suppµ) ≤
max(suppµ0), then %(z,µ) ≥ %(z,µ0).
In fact:
• If suppµ = ∅, then +∞ = min(suppµ) ≤ min(suppµ0), hence suppµ0 = ∅, i.e. µ = µ0 = 0
and %(z,µ) = %(z,µ0) = 0.
• If suppµ0 = ∅, then −∞ = max(suppµ0) ≥ max(suppµ), hence suppµ = ∅, i.e. µ = µ0 = 0
and %(z,µ) = %(z,µ0) = 0.





















. Choose imin ∈
argmini∈I v (xi) and deﬁne imax,jmin,jmax analogously, so that
min(suppµ) = v (ximin),









Then for all i ∈ I there is j = jmax ∈ J such that yj ˙ %xi, and for all j ∈ J there is
























and %(z,µ) ≥ %(z,µ0), as wanted.
For all (z,t,T) ∈ v (C)
1,2, set
η (z,t,T) = %(z,µ)
if µ ∈ M(v (C)) is such that min(suppµ) = t, max(suppµ) = T. Claim 1 implies that η is well
deﬁned and decreasing in the second and third components on v (C).
The function η is diago-null and increasing in the ﬁrst component since % is. The proof
of suﬃciency is concluded by observing that %(z,µ) = η (z,min(suppµ),max(suppµ)) for all
























































Conversely, assume that there exist two non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R, a diago-
null function η : v (C)
1,2 → R, increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing in the second


















60represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
Set %(z,µ) = η (z,min(suppµ),max(suppµ)) for all (z,µ) ∈ pim(u(C)). The function %
is diago-null and increasing in the ﬁrst component since η is. Moreover, if µ0 stochastically
dominates µ and µ0 6= 0, then µ 6= 0 and min(suppµ) ≤ min(suppµ0) and max(suppµ) ≤
max(suppµ0), thus








∀z ∈ v (C)
(η is decreasing in the second and third components on v (C)); if µ0 stochastically dominates µ
and µ0 = 0, then µ = 0 and min(suppµ) = min(suppµ0) = +∞, max(suppµ) = max(suppµ0) =
−∞, thus








∀z ∈ v (C).
In any case if µ0 stochastically dominates µ, then %(z,µ) ≥ %(z,µ0), i.e., % is decreasing (w.r.t.
stochastic dominance) in the second component. By Theorem 2, % on F satisﬁes Axioms A.1-










(i) for all i ∈ I there is j ∈ J such that yj ˙ %xi,
(ii) for all j ∈ J there is i ∈ I such that yj ˙ %xi.









. Else if I and J are non-empty, then (i) implies maxj∈J v (yj) ≥ maxi∈I v (xi),

























. As wanted. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Assume that

ˆ u, ˆ v, ˆ %, ˆ P
































∈ X, by Lemma 9 it follows that ˆ P = P, and there exist α,β ∈ R with α > 0
such that ˆ u = αu+β, and ˆ r = αr; moreover since ˆ v represents ˙ %, there are ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with ˙ α > 0
such that ˆ v = ˙ αv + ˙ β. Let (z,t,T) ∈ ˆ v (C)
1,2 with t,T ∈ ˆ v (C), i,j ∈ N, and xo,xi,xj ∈ C
such that z = ˆ v (xo), t = ˆ v (xi), T = ˆ v (xj), then v (xo) =

z − ˙ β

/ ˙ α, v (xi) =






T − ˙ β

/ ˙ α. Hence
ˆ %(z,t,T) = ˆ r(xo,xi,xj) = αr(xo,xi,xj) = α%(v (xo),v (xi),v (xj)) = α%
 
z − ˙ β
˙ α
,
t − ˙ β
˙ α
,
T − ˙ β
˙ α
!
61and clearly ˆ %(z,+∞,−∞) = 0 = α%
 
z − ˙ β
˙ α
,
+∞ − ˙ β
˙ α
,
−∞ − ˙ β
˙ α
!
for all z ∈ ˆ v (C).
The converse is trivial. In fact, if ˆ P = P, and there exist α,β, ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with α, ˙ α > 0 such
that ˆ u = αu + β, ˆ v = ˙ αv + ˙ β, and ˆ %(z,r,R) = α%
 
z − ˙ β
˙ α
,
r − ˙ β
˙ α
,
R − ˙ β
˙ α
!
for all (z,r,R) ∈
ˆ v (C)
1,2, then ˆ u, ˆ v : C → R are non-constant aﬃne, it is easy to check that ˆ % : ˆ v (C)
1,2 → R
is well deﬁned, diago-null, increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing in the second and
third on ˆ v (C), ˆ P is a probability on Σ, ˆ v represents ˙ %, and




ˆ u(fo (s)) + ˆ %

ˆ v (fo (s)),min
i∈I
ˆ v (fi (s)),max
i∈I
ˆ v (fi (s))






αu(fo (s)) + β + α%
 
ˆ v (fo (s)) − ˙ β
˙ α
,
mini∈I ˆ v (fi (s)) − ˙ β
˙ α
,
















dP (s) + β
= αV (f) + β
obviously represents % on F; ﬁnally ˆ V (F) = αV (F) + β = αu(C) + β = ˆ u(C). 
Proof of Theorem 5. By Theorem 2 there exist two non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R,
a diago-null function % : pim(v (C)) → R increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing (w.r.t.
stochastic dominance) in the second, and a probability P on Σ, such that v represents ˙ % and





















∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
For all (z,µ,µ0) ∈ pid(v (C)) set η (z,µ,µ0) = %(z,µ + µ0), clearly η is well deﬁned and
η (z,0,nδz) = %(z,nδz) = 0 for all z ∈ v (C) and 0 ≤ n ≤ |N|, that is η is diago-null. Moreover,
η is increasing in its ﬁrst component since % is. Next we show that η is decreasing in the second










































































belong to pid(u(C)) we can assume
that I,J,L are ﬁnite subsets of N with I ∩ L = ∅ and J ∩ L = ∅.


























































































If J = ∅, then 0 ≤ Fa ≤ Fb = 0, and it follows that I = ∅ (the ﬁrst case we considered).
Else if I,J 6= ∅, w.l.o.g. we can assume I = {i1,...,in} and J = {j1,...,jm} with ai1 ≤
... ≤ ain < z and bj1 ≤ ... ≤ bjm < z, and Fa ≤ Fb, by Lemma 5, n ≤ m and aik ≥ bjk for












∈ X, be such that v (xo) = z,
v (yjk) = bjk for all k = 1,...,m, v (wl) = zl for all l ∈ L, v (xik) = aik for all k = 1,...,n. Then
xo ˙ xik ˙ %yjk for k = 1,...,n, xo ˙ yjk for k = n+1,...,m, by using n times the deﬁnition of ˙ % and
































































































































































If J = ∅ and I 6= ∅, then w.l.o.g. we can assume I = {i1,...,in} with z ≤ ain ≤ ain−1 ≤






∈ X, be such that v (xo) = z, v (wl) = zl for all l ∈ L,











































































If I = ∅, then 0 ≤ Gb ≤ Ga = 0, and it follows that J = ∅ (the ﬁrst case we considered).
Else if I,J 6= ∅, w.l.o.g. I = {i1,...,in} and J = {j1,...,jm} with z ≤ ain ≤ ... ≤ ai1 and











∈ X, be such that v (xo) = z, v (xik) = aik for all
k = 1,...,n, v (wl) = zl for all l ∈ L, v (yjk) = bjk for all k = 1,...,m. Then xik ˙ %yjk ˙ %xo for
k = 1,...,m, xik ˙ %xo for k = m + 1,...,n, by using m times the deﬁnition of ˙ % and n − m times






































belong to pid(v (C)) we can assume

































































The proof of suﬃciency is concluded by observing that for all µ =
P
i∈I δai ∈ M(v (C)) and





























































Conversely, assume that there exist two non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R, a diago-
null function η : pid(v (C)) → R increasing in the ﬁrst component, decreasing in the second and
third components w.r.t. lower dominance and upper dominance respectively, and a probability























represents % on F and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).




r∈supp(µ):r≥z µ(r)δr are positive
integer measures ﬁnitely supported in v (C)∩(−∞,z) and v (C)∩[z,∞) respectively, and their























for all (z,µ) ∈ pim(v (C)). Notice that %(z,nδz) = η (z,0,nδz) = 0 for all z in v (C) and all
non-negative integers n ≤ |N|, that is % is diago-null. Moreover, % is increasing in its ﬁrst
component (since η is).
Let z ∈ v (C) and µ,µ0 ∈ M(C) are such that µ stochastically dominates µ0. If µ = µ0 = 0,




i=1 ∈ v (C)
n such
65that ai ≥ bi for all i = 1,...,n, µ =
Pn
i=1 δai, and µ0 =
Pn
i=1 δbi. By Lemma 7, G(ai)i:ai≥z (t) ≥





































We conclude that % : pim(v (C)) → R is decreasing w.r.t. stochastic dominance in the second

















i∈Ij:v(xi)≥v(xo) δv(xi) upper stochastically dominates
P

































































δv(xi) (−∞,t] + δv(xj) (−∞,t] ≥ Fv(xi)i∈I:v(xi)<v(xo) (t)
that is
P
i∈I:v(xi)<v(xo) δv(xi) upper stochastically dominates
P

























































This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Let

ˆ u, ˆ v, ˆ %, ˆ P

be another representation of % and ˙ % in the sense





















i∈I:ˆ v(xi)<ˆ v(xo) δˆ v(xi),
P







By Lemma 9, there exist α,β ∈ R with α > 0 such that ˆ u = αu + β, ˆ r = αr, and ˆ P = P.



























































































since ˆ v = ˙ αv + ˙ β amounts to v = ˙ α−1

ˆ v − ˙ β

.
Conversely, if ˆ P = P, and there exist α,β, ˙ α, ˙ β ∈ R with α, ˙ α > 0 such that ˆ u = αu + β,



































pid(ˆ v (C)), then ˆ u, ˆ v : C → R are non-constant aﬃne, it is easy to check that ˆ % : pid(ˆ v (C)) → R
is well deﬁned, diago-null, increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing in the second and
third components w.r.t. lower dominance and upper dominance respectively, ˆ P is a probability
67on Σ, ˆ v represents ˙ %, and




ˆ u(fo (s)) + ˆ %
















αu(fo (s)) + β + α%

















= αV (f) + β
obviously represents % on F; ﬁnally ˆ V (F) = αV (F) + β = αu(C) + β = ˆ u(C). 
Proof of Proposition 7. First, observe that for a real valued function φ deﬁned on an interval
K 3 z the following statements are equivalent:
(i) φ(z) ≥ φ(z + h) + φ(z − h) for all h ≥ 0 such that z ± h ∈ K,
(ii) φ(z) ≥ φ(t) + φ(w) for all t,w ∈ K such that t/2 + w/2 = z.57
Assume % is more envious than proud, relative to an ethically neutral event E, a convex
D ⊆ C, and xo ∈ D. Let t,w ∈ v (D) be such that t/2 + w/2 = v (xo). Choose xi,yi ∈ D such

















implies (1/2)xi + (1/2)yi ˙ ∼ xo, and the assumption of social loss aversion delivers
(xo,xo) % (xo,xiEyi)




(u(xo) + %(v (xo),v (xi))) +
1
2
(u(xo) + %(v (xo),v (yi)))
=⇒ 0 ≥ %(v (xo),v (xi)) + %(v (xo),v (yi))
=⇒ %(v (xo),v (xo)) ≥ %(v (xo),t) + %(v (xo),w).
Therefore 0 = %(v (xo),v (xo)) ≥ %(v (xo),v (xo) + h) + %(v (xo),v (xo) − h) for all h ≥ 0 such
that v (xo) ± h ∈ v (D).
Conversely, if (15) holds, then
%(v (xo),v (xo) + h) + %(v (xo),v (xo) − h) ≤ 0 = %(v (xo),v (xo))
for all h ≥ 0 such that z ± h ∈ v (D), that is
%(v (xo),v (xo)) ≥ %(v (xo),t) + %(v (xo),w)

















57(i)⇒(ii) If t,w ∈ K are such that t/2 + w/2 = z, and t ≥ w, set h = (t − w)/2, it follows that h ≥ 0
and that z + h = t/2 + w/2 + (t/2 − w/2) = t ∈ K, z − h = t/2 + w/2 − (t/2 − w/2) = w ∈ K. By (i),
φ(z) ≥ φ(z + h) + φ(z − h) = φ(t) + φ(w). If t ≤ w, set h = (w − t)/2 and repeat the same argument.
(ii)⇒(i) If h ≥ 0 is such that z ± h ∈ K, then, from (z + h)/2 + (z − h)/2 = z and (ii), it follows that
φ(z) ≥ φ(z + h) + φ(z − h).
68and hence





















=⇒ u(xo) ≥ P (E)(u(xo) + %(v (xo),v (xi))) + (1 − P (E))(u(xo) + %(v (xo),v (yi)))
=⇒ (xo,xo) % (xo,xiEyi).
Thus % is more envious than proud. Finally, inequality (16) easily follows from (15). In fact,
let v (xo) = r ∈ int(v (D)), since %(r,r) = 0
D+
2 %(r,r) = liminf h↓0






























%(r,r + h) − %(r,r)
h
= liminf h↑0





Before entering the details of the proof of Proposition 8, recall that an event E ∈ Σ is essential




for some ¯ c and c
¯
in C. Representation (11) guarantees that this amounts to say
that P (E) ∈ (0,1), in particular, ethically neutral events are essential.
We say that a preference % is averse to social risk, relatively to an essential event E, a
convex set D ⊆ C, and a given xo ∈ C, if
(xo,wi) % (xo,xiEyi)
for all xi,yi,wi ∈ D such that P (E)xi + (1 − P (E))yi ˙ ∼ wi. Notice that this deﬁnition is
consistent with the previous one in which only ethically neutral events E where considered
(thus P (E) = 1/2). Instead of proving Proposition 8 we will prove the more general
Proposition 15 If % admits a representation (11), then % is averse to social risk, relative to
an essential event E, a convex D ⊆ C, and xo ∈ C if and only if %(v (xo),·) is convex on v (D).
Proof of Proposition 15. Assume % is averse to social risk, relative to an essential event E, a
convex D ⊆ C, and xo ∈ C. Essentiality of E guarantees that P (E) = p ∈ (0,1). Therefore, for
all t = v (xi),r = v (yi) ∈ v (D), social risk aversion implies (xo,pxi + (1 − p)yi) % (xo,xiEyi)
and
u(xo) + %(v (xo),v (pxi + (1 − p)yi)) ≥ p(u(xo) + %(v (xo),v (xi))) + (1 − p)(u(xo) + %(v (xo),v (yi)))
u(xo) + %(v (xo),pt + (1 − p)r) ≥ u(xo) + p%(v (xo),t) + (1 − p)%(v (xo),r)
%(v (xo),pt + (1 − p)r) ≥ p%(v (xo),t) + (1 − p)%(v (xo),r)
In turn, this (together with monotonicity of % in the second component) can be shown to imply
continuity of %(v (xo),·) on v (D)\ supv (D). Theorem 88 of Hardy, Littlewood and Polya
(1934) guarantees concavity of %(v (xo),·) on v (D)\ supv (D). Monotonicity again delivers
concavity of %(v (xo),·) on v (D).
69The converse is trivial. 
Proof of Proposition 9. (i)⇒(ii) Taking I = ∅, since u1 and u2 are aﬃne, non-constant,
and represent %1 and %2 on C, we obtain u1 ≈ u2. W.l.o.g. choose u1 = u2 = u. For all  
xo,(xi)i∈I



















that is %2 ≥ %2 on pim(C).

















%2 cIo. As wanted. 
Proof of Proposition 10. By Proposition 9, (i) is equivalent to u1 ≈ u2 and, choosing u1 = u2,
%1 ≤ %2.
























≤ u(yo) < u(xo)































(ii)⇒(i) Since u1 and u2 are aﬃne, if %1 is intrinsically equivalent to %2, then u1 ≈ u2.
















































































. Conclude that: if %2 (·) < 0 then %1 (·) ≤
%2 (·), if %2 (·) ≥ 0, then either %1 (·) > 0 and %1 (·) ≤ %2 (·) or %1 (·) ≤ 0 and %1 (·) ≤ 0 ≤ %2 (·).
In any case %1 (·) ≤ %2 (·). 
Proof of Proposition 11. (i)⇒(ii) Since u1 and u2 are aﬃne and non-constant, if %1 is













































































Conclude that: if %2 (·) < 0 then %1 (·) ≤ %2 (·) < 0 hence |%1 (·)| ≥ |%2 (·)| and %1 (·)%2 (·) > 0,
obviously if %2 (·) = 0 then |%1 (·)| ≥ 0 = |%2 (·)| and %1 (·)%2 (·) = 0, ﬁnally if %2 (·) > 0 then
%1 (·) ≥ %2 (·) > 0 hence |%1 (·)| ≥ |%2 (·)| and %1 (·)%2 (·) > 0.
(ii)⇒(i) Conversely, u1 ≈ u2 clearly implies that %1 is intrinsically equivalent to %2, and













≤ u(yo) − u(xo) < 0


















≤ u(yo) < u(xo)


















≥ u(yo) − u(xo) > 0


















≥ u(yo) > u(xo)





Proof of Theorem 8. We only prove suﬃciency, the converse being easy. By Theorem 2 there
exist two non-constant aﬃne functions u,v : C → R, a diago-null function % : pim(v (C)) → R
increasing in the ﬁrst component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second,
and p0,p1,...,pT ≥ 0 with
PT






















∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes W (F) = u(C). Essentiality of {0} implies




































∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = p−1
0 u(C).































u(C). If T = 1, then
b1 > 0 and (28) holds with β = b1. If T > 1, arbitrarily ﬁx a ∈ Ao, and for all t < T and









a(τ) if τ 6= t,t + 1
c if τ = t







a(τ) if τ 6= t,t + 1
¯ c if τ = t










a(τ) if τ 6= t,t + 1
c if τ = t












∈ C × C
72and so by the function
Ut  
c,c0






∈ C × C.
Then b0 = 1 implies bt 6= 0 for all t < T. Let, per contra, τ = min{t < T : bt = 0} and c,c0 ∈ C
















+ bτ+1u(c) > bτu(c) + bτ+1u(c)
bτ+1u(c) > bτ+1u(c)
which is absurd. Finally, the uniqueness of the subjective probability in an Anscombe-Aumann
representation implies that, for all τ,t < T, bt (bt + bt+1)
−1 = bτ (bτ + bτ+1)
−1, btbτ + btbτ+1 =







The proof of suﬃciency is concluded by setting β = b1 and applying (40) T − 1 times. 
Lemma 12 A binary relation % on F satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.6 and F.1 if and only if there
exist a non-constant aﬃne function u : C → R, a diago-null function % : pim(u(C)) → R, and


















∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
The triplet

ˆ u, ˆ %, ˆ P

is another representation of % in the above sense if and only if ˆ P = P






















Proof. By Lemma 9, there exist a non-constant aﬃne function u : C → R, a function r : X → R
with r(cIo) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘(N), and a probability P on Σ, such that the functional














∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).




























such that z = u(xo) and µ = µ(u(xi))i∈I exists for every (z,µ) ∈ pim(u(C)).58 If µ(u(xi))i∈I =


























































If z ∈ u(C) and 0 ≤ n ≤ |N|, take c ∈ C such that u(c) = z and I ∈ ℘(N) such that
|I| = n, then %(z,nδz) = r(cIo) = 0.









all f ∈ F. This completes the proof of the suﬃciency part of the Theorem.
As for the necessity part, we just have to show that a preference represented by (41)


























∈ X be such that xo ∼ yo and
there is a bijection σ : J → I such that for every j ∈ J, yj ∼ xσ(j). If I = ∅, then J = ∅ and




































From the special case in which xo = yo and yj = xσ(j) for all j ∈ J, it follows that Axiom A.6
holds. From the special case in which I = J and σ is the identity, it follows that Axiom F.1
holds.
The proof of the uniqueness part is very similar to that of Proposition 1. 
58In any case take xo ∈ u
−1 (z) . If µ = 0 take I = ∅. Else if µ =
Pn
k=1 δzk for some n ≥ 1, take a subset
I = {i1,...,in} of N with cardinality n and arbitrarily choose xik ∈ u
−1 (zk) for all k = 1,...,n.
74Proof of Theorem 9. By Lemma 12 there exist a non-constant aﬃne function u : C → R,
a diago-null function % : pim(u(C)) → R, and a probability P on Σ, such that the function


















∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C).
For all (z,µ,ν) ∈ pid(u(C)) set ξ (z,µ,ν) = %(z,µ + ν), clearly ξ is well deﬁned and
ξ (z,0,nδz) = %(z,nδz) = 0 for all z ∈ u(C) and 0 ≤ n ≤ |N|, that is ξ is diago-null. Next we














































Else if I,J 6= ∅, then |I| = |J|, and w.l.o.g. we can assume I = {i1,...,in} and J = {j1,...,jn}
with ai1 ≤ ... ≤ ain < z and bj1 ≤ ... ≤ bjn < z, and Fa ≤ Fb, by Lemma 5, aik ≥ bjk for all












∈ X, be such that u(xo) = z,
u(yjk) = bjk for all k = 1,...,n, u(wl) = zl for all l ∈ L, u(xjk) = aik for all k = 1,...,n. Then

































































































A similar argument shows that Axiom F.2 also delivers decreasing monotonicity of ξ in the third
component w.r.t. stochastic dominance.
This completes the proof of the suﬃciency part.





r∈supp(µ):r≥z µ(r)δr are positive integer measures ﬁnitely supported in u(C) ∩ (−∞,z)



































belong to pid(u(C)) we can assume
that I,J,L are ﬁnite subsets of N with I ∩ L = ∅ and J ∩ L = ∅.
75and notice that %(z,nδz) = ξ (z,0,nδz) = 0 for all z in u(C) and all non-negative integers
n ≤ |N|. Thus u : C → R is a non-constant aﬃne function, a % : pim(u(C)) → R is a diago-null






































∈ F, represents % and satisﬁes V (F) = u(C). Lemma 12 guarantees that %
satisﬁes Axioms A.1-A.6 and F.1.




∈ X, j ∈ I, and c ∈ C.




































. Else, if c - xj ≺ xo, then u(c) ≤ u(xj) < u(xo), and,
by Lemma 7,
P
i∈I:u(xi)<u(xo) δu(xi) stochastically dominates
P

































This completes the proof. 
The proof of Proposition 13 is very similar to the one of Proposition 1, thus omitted.
11.5 Social Economics: Proofs and Related Analysis







πs [γi (v(xs) − zs)] (42)
for all (x,y,z) ∈ RS+1
+ × RS+1























for all (c,e) ∈ LS+1
+ × LS+1
+ .









I (v ◦ c∗
s)dλ for all s ∈ S0, for λ-almost all i ∈ I. The converse is true up to a
λ-negligible variation of (c∗,e∗).60
The simple proof is omitted.
Lemma 14 If H.1 holds, then Bi is compact and nonempty for all i ∈ I.


































+ : Fi,S (yS) + R(Fi,0 (y0) − x0) − xS = 0
o
which is compact since the functions
(x,y) 7→ Fi,0 (y0) − x0
(x,y) 7→ Fi,s (ys) + R(Fi,0 (y0) − x0) − xs











which implies Bi 6= ∅. 










πs [γi (v(xs) − zs)]
for all (x,y,z) ∈ RS+1
+ × RS+1
+ × RS+1, where π0 = 1 and πs = βps for all s ∈ S.
Since RS+1
+ × RS+1
+ and RS+1 are Polish spaces, assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 of Balder (1995)
hold.
Since Bi is nonempty and compact for all i ∈ I, assumption 2.3 of Balder (1995) holds.
For every i ∈ I, Wi : RS+1
+ ×RS+1
+ ×RS+1 → R is continuous, therefore assumptions 2.4 and
2.6 of Balder (1995) hold.







(i,(x,y)) 7→ Fi,0 (y0) − x0
(i,(x,y)) 7→ Fi,s (ys) + R(Fi,0 (y0) − x0) − xs
60A λ-negligible variation of a function on a measure space (I,Λ,λ) is a function that coincides λ-almost
everywhere with the original one.


















+ : Fi,s (ys) + R(Fi,0 (y0) − x0) − xs = 0
o







Moreover, the functions i 7→ Fs (i,hs (i)) are Λ-measurable for all s ∈ S0, since i 7→ (i,hs (i))
is Λ-measurable on I and (i,t) 7→ Fi,s (t) is a Caratheodory function on I × R+. Therefore the
graph of the correspondence
i 7→ [0,Fi,0 (hi,0)] ×
S Y
s=1














































+ : Fi,S (yS) + R(Fi,0 (y0) − x0) − xS = 0
o







and assumption 2.5 of Balder (1995) holds.







, hence it is Λ × B(Rn)-measurable, therefore assumption 2.7 of Balder
(1995) holds.
Now deﬁne gs : I × RS+1
+ × RS+1
+ → R by gs (i,(x,y)) = v (xs) for all s ∈ S0. Let s ∈ S0,
clearly gs (i,(·,·)) is continuous on RS+1
+ ×RS+1
+ for all i ∈ I and gs (·,(x,y)) is constant – hence
Λ-measurable – on I for all (x,y) ∈ RS+1
+ × RS+1
+ . Therefore gs is a Caratheodory function for
all s ∈ S0, in particular, it is Λ × B(Rn)-measurable. For all i ∈ I
inf
(x,y)∈Bi
gs (i,(x,y)) = inf
(x,y)∈Bi
v (xs) ≥ v (0)
sup
(x,y)∈Bi
gs (i,(x,y)) = sup
(x,y)∈Bi
v (xs) ≤ sup
xs∈[0,Fi,s(hi,s)+RFi,0(hi,0)]
v (xs) = v (Fi,s (hi,s) + RFi,0 (hi,0))
and i 7→ v (Fi,s (hi,s) + RFi,0 (hi,0)) is Λ-measurable and bounded (by H.2.i). Therefore assump-
tion 3.4.2 of Balder (1995) holds.
Finally, nonatomicity of λ guarantees that assumption 3.4.1 of Balder (1995) holds too.
Therefore, by Theorem 3.4.1 of Balder (1995) there exists a λ-measurable a.e. selection
(c∗,e∗) of the correspondence
B : i 7→ Bi





























Since Bi is never empty, wlog, we can assume that (c∗
i,e∗
i) ∈ Bi for all i ∈ I. Then, by Corollary,






(Fi,s (hi,s) + hi,s)

which is ﬁnite by H.2.i, and observing that, for all i ∈ I,
Bi ⊆ [0,Fi,0 (hi,0)] ×
S Y
s=1
















Setting Ui (y) = ui (Fi (y),y) for all y ∈ R+ it is easily checked that
U0

































H.3 guarantees that U00




i never vanishes, since derivatives have the Darboux property, then Ui is either strictly
increasing or decreasing on [0,hi] and the maximum is achieved at y∗
i = hi or y∗
i = 0 (and
nowhere else).
If U0
i vanishes at some y∗
i in (0,hi), then y∗
i is the unique maximum (U0
i is strictly decreasing
on (0,hi)).
We can conclude that if an equilibrium proﬁle (c∗,e∗) exists, then it is, λ-a.e. unique since
it must satisfy
c∗
i = Fi (y∗
i ) and e∗
i = y∗
i
for λ-almost all i ∈ I. 
For any function f on R, set
D±f(t) = lim sup
h→0±
f(t + h) − f(t)
h
and D±f(t) = lim inf
h→0±
f(t + h) − f(t)
h
. (43)
Next proposition shows that H.1, H.2, and H.4(iii) imply that W : E → L is well deﬁned.
79Proposition 16 If H1-H2 hold, then W(·) (e) : i 7→ Wi (e) is Λ-measurable for all e ∈ E.






|ui (x,y) + γi (z)|
!
< ∞ ∀n ∈ N. (44)
Proof. Fix e ∈ E. The function i 7→ Fi (e(i)) is Λ-measurable, since i 7→ (i,e(i)) is Λ-
measurable from I to I ×R+ and (i,t) 7→ Fi (t) is a Caratheodory function from I ×R+ to R+.




For every i ∈ I, the real valued function on R2
+ deﬁned by
(x,y) 7→ ui(x,y) + γi (v(x) − m∗)
is continuous, and for every (x,y) ∈ R2
+, the real valued function on I deﬁned by
i 7→ ui(x,y) + γi (v(x) − m∗)
is Λ-measurable, hence the real valued function on I × R2
+ deﬁned by
(i,(x,y)) 7→ ui(x,y) + γi (v(x) − m∗) (45)





-measurable (being a Caratheodory function).
Conclude that
i 7→ (i,Fi (ei),ei)
is Λ-measurable from I to I × R2
+ (since i 7→ Fi (e(i)) is Λ-measurable), and its composition




|Wi (e)| = sup
i∈I
|ui (Fi (ei),ei) + γi (v(Fi (ei)) − m∗)|.
By H.2.i, Ξ = supi∈I (Fi (hi) + hi) < ∞ hence (0,0) ≤ (Fi (ei),ei) ≤ (Fi (hi),hi) ≤ (Ξ,Ξ) for
all i ∈ I, moreover v (Fi (ei)) ∈ [v (0),v (Ξ)] and v (Fi (ei)) − m∗ ∈ [v (0) − m∗,v (Ξ) − m∗] for
all i ∈ I, thus
sup
i∈I





|ui (x,y) + γi (z)|
!
which is ﬁnite if (44) holds. 
Lemma 15 If H.1-H.3 and H.4.i hold, then all social equilibria (c∗,e∗) are such that c∗
i ≥ ˆ ci
and e∗
i ≥ ˆ ei λ-a.e. If (c∗,e∗) is internal and D+γi > 0, then, e∗
i > ˆ ei and c∗
i > ˆ ci λ-a.e..
Proof. Notice that, by Lemma 13, if a pair (c∗,e∗) ∈ L×L is a social equilibrium, then, setting
m∗ =
R
(v ◦ c∗)dλ, (c∗
i,e∗
i) is a solution of problem
max
(x,y)∈Bi
ui(x,y) + γi (v(x) − m∗). (46)
For all i ∈ I, problem (46) is equivalent to
max
0≤y≤hi
ui (Fi (y),y) + γi (v(Fi (y)) − m∗).
80If (c∗,e∗) is a social equilibrium and (ˆ c, ˆ e) is the asocial equilibrium, then for λ-almost all
i ∈ I,
e∗
i ∈ arg max
0≤y≤hi
ui (Fi (y),y) + γi (v(Fi (y)) − m∗),
c∗






ˆ ei ∈ arg max
0≤y≤hi
ui (Fi (y),y),
ˆ ci = F (ˆ ei).
If e∗
i = hi or ˆ ei = 0, then e∗
i ≥ ˆ ei and c∗
i = Fi (e∗
i) ≥ Fi (ˆ ei) = ˆ ci.
If e∗
i = 0 and ˆ ei > 0, then:
• either U0
i never vanishes in (0,hi),61 then Ui is strictly increasing (it cannot be strictly
decreasing, otherwise ˆ ei = 0), but also γi (v(Fi (·)) − m∗) is increasing and the inclusion
0 ∈ arg max
0≤y≤hi
ui (Fi (y),y) + γi (v(Fi (y)) − m∗) = arg max
0≤y≤hi
Ui (y) + γi (v(Fi (y)) − m∗)
is absurd,
• or U0
i vanishes at ˆ ei ∈ (0,hi), then U0
i – being strictly decreasing – must be positive in a
right neighborhood of 0, again ui (Fi (·),·) + γi (v(Fi (·)) − m∗) is strictly increasing in a
right neighborhood of 0, which is absurd.
It follows that, if e∗
i = 0, then ˆ ei = 0, thus e∗
i ≥ ˆ ei and c∗
i = Fi (e∗
i) ≥ Fi (ˆ ei) = ˆ ci.
Finally, if e∗
i ∈ (0,hi), then
D+ [ui (Fi (·),·) + γi (v(Fi (·)) − m∗)](e∗
















i)) − m∗). (48)
By monotonicity, D+γi ≥ 0, therefore U0
i (e∗
i) ≤ 0, which implies e∗
i ≥ ˆ ei because from the proof
of Lemma 3 we know that Ui is concave on [0,hi] with a unique maximum. Again c∗
i = Fi (e∗
i) ≥
Fi (ˆ ei) = ˆ ci.
Suppose that (c∗,e∗) is an internal social equilibrium and D+γi > 0. Then (48) delivers
U0
i (e∗
i) < 0, which implies e∗
i > ˆ ei because from the proof of Lemma 3 we know that Ui is
concave on [0,hi] with a unique maximum. It follows that c∗
i = Fi (e∗
i) > Fi (ˆ ei) = ˆ ci. 
Proposition 17 If assumptions H.1-H.4 hold. Then all internal social equilibrium proﬁles
(e∗,c∗) are strongly ineﬃcient.
Proof. Suppose, per contra, that (c∗,e∗) ∈ L × L is a social equilibrium with e∗ ∈ int(E) and
(c∗,e∗) is not strongly ineﬃcient. Let f : L → R be deﬁned by f (ξ) = essinfλ [ξ − W (e∗)] for
all ξ ∈ L. Then, f (W (e∗)) = 0 and f (W (e)) ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E. Moreover, f is a concave
niveloid.62
61Ui is deﬁned in the proof of Lemma 3.
62A functional f : M → R is a niveloid if and only if for all ψ and ϕ in M and c ∈ R:
81Next we show that there is no concave niveloid f : L → R such that e∗ solves the problem
maxe∈E (f ◦ W)(e), which is absurd.
First observe that Gateaux diﬀerentiability of W guarantees that for all e ∈ intE there exists
a linear and continuous operator ∇W (e) : L → L such that
lim
t→0
W (e + tk) − W (e)
t
= ∇W (e)(k) ∈ L (49)














A fortiori, for all i ∈ I,
Wi (e + tk) − Wi (e)
t
→ ∇W (e)(k)i as t → 0,
but for all i ∈ I
Wi (e + tk) − Wi (e)
t
=
ui (Fi (ei + tki),ei + tki) + γi
 
v(Fi (ei + tki)) −
R













As we show below, this implies that
∇W (e)(k)i = kiU0
















for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
Rearrange to obtain that for all i ∈ I
Wi (e + tk) − Wi (e)
t
=






v(Fi (ei + tki)) −
R










Consider the ﬁrst term: if ki 6= 0,








i (ei) as t → 0
and the same is true if ki = 0.
For the second term, consider only t ∈ (−δ,δ) with δ small enough so that e+tk ∈ intE. Then
eι,eι+tkι ∈ (0,hι) for all ι ∈ I and Fι (eι + tkι),Fι (eι) > Fι (0) ≥ 0. Let {tn}n∈N ⊆ (−δ,δ)\{0}
be a sequence which converges to 0. For all ι ∈ I
v (Fι (eι + tnkι)) − v (Fι (eι))
tn
→ v0 (Fι (eι))F0
ι (eι)kι.
• ϕ ≥ ψ implies f (ϕ) ≥ f (ψ),
• f(ϕ + c) = f(ϕ) + c.
See Dolecki and Greco [45].
82Moreover, for all n ∈ N, there exists ¯ eι,n between eι and eι + tnkι and ϕι,n between Fι (eι) and
Fι (eι + tnkι) such that
 
 






















but notice that 0 ≤ ¯ eι,n ≤ khksup and 0 ≤ ϕι,n ≤ supj∈I Fj (hj) < ∞ (by H.2.i). Therefore,








 ≤ rkkksup .
The Dominated Convergence Theorem yields
Z






The arbitrary choice of {tn}n∈N implies
Z





ι (eι)kιdλ(ι) as t → 0.
Therefore for all i, the function deﬁned for all t ∈ (−δ,δ) by
φi (t) = v(Fi (ei + tki)) −
Z








v(Fi (ei + tki)) −
R





















hence it is diﬀerentiable in 0 and φ0










v(Fi (ei + tki)) −
R



























If f : L → R is concave niveloid, then it is Lipschitz and its superdiﬀerential at each point
consists of probability charges that are absolutely continuous with respect to λ.
By a chain rule for the Clarke diﬀerential (see [39, Theorem 2.3.10]), we have that f ◦ W
is Lipschitz near e and ∂ (f ◦ W)(e) ⊆ ∂f (W (e)) ◦ ∇W (e). That is, for all µ ∈ ∂ (f ◦ W)(e)
there is ν ∈ ∂f (W (e)) such that µ = ν ◦ ∇W (e). Therefore, for all k ∈ L





























83If, as assumed per contra, e∗ is a local maximum of f ◦ W on E, then ∂ (f ◦ W)(e∗) 3 0, and






































dν (i) = 0
(51)
But, for all i ∈ I, problem (46) is equivalent to
max
0≤y≤hi
ui (Fi (y),y) + γi (v(Fi (y)) − m∗). (52)
Therefore, if (c∗,e∗) is an internal social equilibrium,
• c∗
i = Fi (e∗
i) for all i ∈ I.
• e∗





In particular, ﬁrst order conditions implied by the second point, see (47) and recall that now



























































































































































∗)dν (i) = 0.
Since v0 and F0





ι)kιdλ(ι) > 0 for





i)) − m∗)dν (i) = 0
which is absurd since γ0
i is bounded away from 0. 
Proof of Proposition 12: it is an immediate consequence of Lemma 15 and Proposition 17
Proof of Lemma 4. Clearly U is continuous and strictly concave on [0, ¯ x0]. Therefore
argmaxx∈[0,¯ x0] U (x) is a singleton. The conditions on the directional derivatives provide in-
ternality. 
Proof of Theorem 7. Set




ps [γ (v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − x)) − m∗
s)]
84for all x ∈ [0, ¯ x0], and ys = ¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − x) for all s ∈ S.
For all x∗ ∈ [0, ¯ x0),
D+W (x∗) = limsuph→0+

U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗





s∈S βps [γ (v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − x∗ − h)) − m∗






U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗





s∈S βps [γ (v(y∗
s − Rh) − m∗






U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
˙ + limsuph→0+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗








s − Rh) − m∗





D+W (x∗) = liminf h→0+

U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗





s∈S βps [γ (v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − x∗ − h)) − m∗






U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗





s∈S βps [γ (v(y∗
s − Rh) − m∗






U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
+ liminf h→0+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗








s − Rh) − m∗





Analogously, for all x∗ ∈ (0, ¯ x0],
D−W (x∗) = limsuph→0−

U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗





s∈S βps [γ (v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − x∗ − h)) − m∗






U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗





s∈S βps [γ (v(y∗
s − Rh) − m∗






U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
˙ + limsuph→0−
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗








s − Rh) − m∗





D−W (x∗) = liminf h→0−

U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗





s∈S βps [γ (v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − x∗ − h)) − m∗






U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗





s∈S βps [γ (v(y∗
s − Rh) − m∗






U (x∗ + h) − U (x∗)
h
+ liminf h→0−
γ (v (x∗ + h) − m∗








s − Rh) − m∗





(i) Consider any symmetric consumption proﬁle, where all agents consume the same amount
x∗ ∈ [0, ¯ x0] in the ﬁrst period (i.e. c∗
i = x∗ for all i ∈ I), and y∗
s = ¯ xs +R(¯ x0 −x∗) in each state










v (¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − x∗))dλ(ι) = v(y∗
s) ∀s ∈ S.
For x∗ ∈ [0, ¯ x0)
D+W (x∗) ≥ U0
+ (x∗) + liminf h→0+







s − Rh) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (v (y∗




+ (x∗) + liminf h→0+










s − Rh)) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (v (y∗
s) − v (y∗
s))
h
since γ|(−∞,0] ≡ 0, then
D+W (x∗) ≥ U0
+ (x∗) + liminf h→0+
γ (v (x∗ + h) − v (x∗)) − γ (0)
h
.
Moreover v0 : R+ → R deﬁned by
v0 (h) = v (x∗ + h) − v (x∗) ∀h ∈ [0,+∞)
is concave, strictly increasing and continuous with
v0 (0) = 0,
(v0)
0
+ (0) = lim
h→0+





D+W (x∗) ≥ U0
+ (x∗) + liminf h→0+
γ (v0 (h)) − γ (v0 (0))
h
= U0
+ (x∗) + D+ (γ ◦ v0)(0).
The assumption D+γ (0) > 0 allows to apply a chain rule for Dini derivatives so that
D+W (x∗) ≥ U0
+ (x∗) + (v0)
0
+ (0)D+γ (v0 (0)) = U0
+ (x∗) + v0
+ (x∗)D+γ (0).
Analogously, for x∗ ∈ (0, ¯ x0]
D−W (x∗) ≤ U0
− (x∗) ˙ + limsuph→0−







s − Rh) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (0)
h
= U0














s + Rh) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (0)
−h
since γ|(−∞,0] ≡ 0, then
D−W (x∗) ≤ U0










s + Rh) − v (y∗









s + Rh) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (0)
h
.
Moreover, for all s ∈ S, vs : R+ → R deﬁned by
vs (h) = v (y∗
s + Rh) − v (y∗
s) ∀h ∈ [0,+∞)
is concave, strictly increasing and continuous with
vs (0) = 0,
(vs)
0
+ (0) = lim
h→0+
v (y∗













D−W (x∗) ≤ U0




γ (vs(h)) − γ (vs (0))
h
= U0
− (x∗) ˙ −β
X
s∈S
psD+ (γ ◦ vs)(0).
The assumption D+γ (0) > 0 allows to apply a chain rule for Dini derivatives so that
D−W (x∗) ≤ U0





+ (0)D+γ (vs (0)) = U0







D+W (x∗) ≥ U0
+ (x∗) + v0
+ (x∗)D+γ (0) ∀x∗ ∈ [0, ¯ x0) and
D−W (x∗) ≤ U0





s)D+γ (0) ∀x∗ ∈ (0, ¯ x0].
87• If x∗ ∈ (0, ¯ x0), then, since u is diﬀerentiable on (0,+∞), U is diﬀerentiable at x∗ and
U0
+ (x∗) = U0
− (x∗) = U0 (x∗), thus
– either U0 (x∗) ≥ 0, then D+W (x∗) > 0 and x∗ is not a maximizer.
– either U0 (x∗) < 0, then D−W (x∗) < 0 and x∗ is not a maximizer.
• If x∗ = 0 then U0
+ (0) > 0 and D+W (x∗) > 0, thus x∗ is not a maximizer.
• If x∗ = ¯ x0 then U0
− (¯ x0) < 0 and D−W (x∗) < 0, thus x∗ is not a maximizer.
(ii) Notice that if c∗ ∈ L is a social equilibrium, then, setting m∗
0 =
R




I v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − cι))dλ(ι) for all s ∈ S, c∗
i is a solution of problem
max
x∈[0,¯ x0]




ps [γ (v (¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − x)) − m∗
s)] (53)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
Let c∗ : I → R be an asymmetric social equilibrium and I∗ ∈ Λ be such that λ(I∗) = 1 and
c∗
i is a solution of problem (53) for all i ∈ I∗.






0.63 Analogously, for all
s ∈ S there exists is ∈ I∗, such that v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − c∗
is) < m∗
s for all s ∈ S.
Suppose agent i1 is such that c∗
i1 = maxs∈S c∗
is. Then,
v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − c∗
i1)) ≤ v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − c∗
is)) < m∗
s ∀s ∈ S.












v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − c∗
i1)) < m∗
s < v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − c∗


















but vs : x 7→ v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − x)) is concave for all s ∈ S (since v is concave) and
v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − c∗
i0)) > v



















s < v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − c∗
i0) for all s ∈ S. Analogously, for any s ∈ S










































































v (c∗ (ι))dλ(ι) = m∗
0.
Summing up, there exists i0,i1 ∈ I∗ such that c∗
i0 and c∗













v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − c∗
i1)) < m∗
s < v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − c∗
i0)) ∀s ∈ S.
In particular 0 ≤ c∗
i0 < c∗




i0 + ε < c∗
i1 − ε < c∗
i1 ≤ ¯ x0, (54)
v (x) < m∗
0 and m∗







0 < v (x) and v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − x)) < m∗
s ∀s ∈ S,∀x ∈
 
c∗
i1 − ε, ¯ x0

. (56)


















































































































































Consider the function v0 : R+ → R deﬁned by






0 ∀h ∈ [0,+∞)
v0 is concave, strictly increasing and continuous with
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since the second summand is null because of γ|[0,+∞) ≡ 0 and equation (56). Consider, for all
s ∈ S the function vs : R+ → R deﬁned by
vs (h) = v
  
¯ xs + R
 






s ∀h ∈ [0,+∞)
is concave, strictly increasing and continuous with
vs (0) = v
 
¯ xs + R
 











¯ xs + R
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¯ xs + R
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¯ xs + R
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¯ xs + R
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¯ xs + R
 
¯ x0 − c∗
i1

equation (56) implies vs (0) = v(¯ xs + R(¯ x0 − c∗
i1) − m∗









































































¯ xs + R
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¯ xs + R
 
¯ x0 − c∗
i1

D+γ (vs (0)) > 0. (58)
Denoting by ˆ c the unique (internal) asocial equilibrium it follows, from the diﬀerentiability
of u on (0,+∞), that
U0
+ (ˆ c) = U0
− (ˆ c) = U0 (ˆ c) = 0.
90Thus, since U0
+ and U0







< 0 = U0
+ (ˆ c) ⇒ c∗







> 0 = U0
− (ˆ c) ⇒ c∗
i1 < ˆ c
and c∗
i0 > c∗
i1 which contradicts (54). Therefore c∗ is not a social equilibrium.
Finally suppose D−γ (0) = 0 and c∗ : I → R is a symmetric equilibrium with c∗
i = x∗ for
λ-almost all i ∈ I. Then
0 ≥ D+W (x∗) ≥ U0














s − Rh)) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (0)
h
if x∗ ∈ [0, ¯ x0) and
0 ≤ D−W (x∗) ≤ U0














s + Rh)) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (0)
−h
if x∗ ∈ (0, ¯ x0]. Then γ|[0,+∞) ≡ 0 delivers
0 ≥ D+W (x∗) ≥ U0








s − Rh)) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (0)
h
= U0









s + R(−h))) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (0)
(−h)
= U0








s + R(−h))) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (0)
(−h)
= U0





s + Rh)) − v (y∗
s)) − γ (0)
h
if x∗ ∈ [0, ¯ x0), and
0 ≤ D−W (x∗) ≤ U0




γ (v (x∗ − h) − v (x∗)) − γ (0)
−h
= U0
− (x∗) ˙ + limsuph→0−
γ (v (x∗ + h) − v (x∗)) − γ (0)
h
if x∗ ∈ (0, ¯ x0].
A suitable chain rule delivers
0 ≥ D+W (x∗) ≥ U0






that is, 0 ≥ D+W (x∗) ≥ U0
+ (x∗) if x∗ ∈ [0, ¯ x0), and
0 ≤ D−W (x∗) ≤ U0
− (x∗) ˙ +v0
− (x∗)D−γ (0)
that is, 0 ≤ D−W (x∗) ≤ U0
− (x∗) if x∗ ∈ (0, ¯ x0]. Therefore x∗ is a maximizer for U. 
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